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INTRODUCTION
When Whites first came to North America to stay some 500
years ago,1 they encountered an indigenous population living in
relative balance with the land.' It was, perhaps, not a perfect harmony,
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law; B.A. 1966,
Middlebury College;J.D. 1969, University of Colorado School of Law; LL.M. 1972, University
of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law; S.J.D. 1985, Northwestern University School of Law.
The author wishes to thank Brooks Best and Cathy Legan for their help in the preparation of
this Article.
1. The ongoing debate about when Whites first arrived in North America was a back-
ground factor in the case of Bonnischsen v. United States, 217 F Supp. 2d. 1116 (D. Ore. 2002),
aff'd 2004 WL 2005830 (9th Cir. 2004), which dealt with jurisdiction over a 9000 year old
skeleton with "Caucasoid" features. SeeJohn W Ragsdale Jr., Some Philosophical, Political and Legal
Inplications of American Archeological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. Rayv. 1, 39-52
(2001) [hereinafter eory].
2. See DONALD HUGHES, AMERICAN INDIAN ECOLOGY 1-9 (1983); see also R. DOUGLAS
HURT, INDIAN AGRICULTURE IN AMEIuCA 27-64 (1987); FRANcis JENNINGs, THE FOUNDERS OF
AMERICA 83-89 (1993).
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as revisionist scholars have pointed out,3 but it was, nonetheless, a
relationship apparently capable of enduring indefinitely.' Regardless of
episodic or localized instability caused by erosion, over-hunting, or
deforestation,5 the distinguishing socio-economic facts were that the
native peoples, in general, did not treat the land as a commodity, they
did not regard it as a freely exploitable resource, they were not
preoccupied with the economic growth or personal gain, and in a
religious sense, they did not believe in human domination over the rest
of the world. 6 Instead, their central beliefs and core religious precepts
were balance and reciprocity.7 These formed the center of the living
community among the people and with the land. They bespoke of the
privilege to live and the duty to respect the gift from nature and the
return of filial piety.' The patterns of land use in such holistic, organic
settings included spiritually-based economics, subsistence agriculture,
hunting and gathering, and religious pilgrimages, rites, and shrines in a
sacred landscape. 9 How, if at all, were these delicately-positioned
subsistence communities and economics to survive the encounter with
the Judeo-Christian belief in human transcendence," the relentless,
calculated efficiency of the free market, capitalistic economy," the
commodification of the land," and the enshrinement (and isolation) of
the individual?13
The initial engagements were not abruptly and encompassingly
dispossessive and genocidal. The comparatively lighter touch may have
reflected an expediency forced by initially inferior members rather than
moral or legal compunction. 4 Indeed, as the number and power of the
non-Indians grew, their physical force and cultural arrogance seemed to
increase directly. 5 The result was a series of accommodations with Whites
which respected or protected at least some aspects of the indigenous
3. See generally SHEPARD KRECH III, THE EcOLoGIcAL INDIAN: MytH AND HISTORY
(1999).
4. JOHN COLLIER, INDIANS OFTHE AMERICAS, 15-28 (1947) [hereinafter COLLIER].
5. KRECH, supra note 3, at 211-16.
6. HuGHEs, supra note 2, at 1-9.
7. JOHN COLLIER, ON THE GLEAMING WAY 15-31, 159-62 (1962) [hereinafter COLLIER,
GLEAMING WAY].
8. See WLA CATHER, THE PROFESSOR'S HousE 251 (1973).
9. See HUGHES, supra note 2, at 1-9; see also HuRr, supra note 2, at 27-64.
10. Lawrence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environ-
mental Law, 83 YALE LJ. 1315, 1334-35 (1974).
11. See COLLIER, supra note 4, at 23-25.
12. SeeJosEPH M. P rULLA,AMERicAN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 72-131 (1977).
13. See Carl Schurz, Present Aspects of the Indian Problem, in AMEpiCANIZING THE AMERICAN
INDIAN 13-26 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973).
14. I FRANCES PAUL PRUCHA,THE GREAT FATHER 11-18 (1984).
15. Id. at 70-72.
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relationship with the tribal land, but which became, over time,
increasingly restricted.
The first encounter or accommodation involved contract, though
as often noted, it is quite clear that the tribes did not fully understand
the concepts of agency, bargain, and sale of land, nor the language in
which treaties were written. 6 Still, the treaties often assured homeland
islands or reserves that were held and used as before-the qualitative
depth of the life ways continued even though the quantitative breadth
of occupation diminished.'7 Questions later emerged, however, as to
the lands yielded and as to whether tribal usage, set in time immemo-
rial, survived the cessions.'"
The property inroad followed contract. The Europeans had
brought their own concepts of law and property, and when their supe-
rior numbers and technology, along with their infectious diseases,
afforded them physical dominance over the native inhabitants, they
enforced these legal precepts over the lands acquired. White hegem-
ony-racial, military, economic, legal, and political-limited the
resultant legal contentions of the Native American population to a
grinding end game of attenuated claims to the residuum. 9 In making
these begrudged claims, the tribes, as "domestic dependent nations,'
2
0
were forced to speak in-and accept-the language and concepts of
the conqueror. The claims assertable by the tribal peoples were, in the
absence of the majority's formal recognition, treaty, or statute,2' charac-
terized by the nomenclature and inherent limitations of "aboriginal
rights" or "original Indian title. 22
Johnson v. McIntosh23 was the keystone decision on Indian property
rights and on the legitimacy of European land claims and resultant
titles. Chief Justice John Marshall, responding to the "actual state of
things ' 24 and the needs of the time as well as his own moral
16. Charles F.Wilkinson & John M.Volkman,Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation;As
Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the--How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601,
608-10 (1975).
17. See, e.g., Ex Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); see also Steven Paul McSloy,
The Miners' Canary:A Birds Eye View ofAmerican Indian Law and Its Future, 37 NEW ENG. L. Rv.
733,735-36 (2003).
18. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999);
United States v.Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
19. See generally MICHAEL LIEDER &JAKE PAGEWLDJUSTICE x-xi (1997).
20. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
21. SeeTee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277-78 (1955) ("Where the
Congress by treaty or other agreement has declared that thereafter Indians were to hold the
lands permanently, compensation must be paid for subsequent taking.").
22. Id. at 279-81.
23. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
24. Id. at 591. Marshall stated:
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proclivities, retooled the international law of discovery 2 and combined
it with the English common law of property. Marshall thus created an
amalgam from diverse legal origins, and created a basis for a national
property system with chains of title traceable back to a point in time
and a unified source. Simultaneously, the rights of the inhabitants-and
the moral responsibility of a dominant power-were not wholly
disregarded. 6 It was a balancing act with the paramount virtue in the
preservation and legitimization of continuity and the conceptual
shortfall lying in the failure to reach either of the logical extremes of
absolute right in the conqueror or absolute restitution to the
overborne victims.27
When Europe first became aware of the Americas, the interna-
tional law embraced a convention whereby the discovery of new lands
by a White, Christian nation was entitled to respect and recognition by
other similar nations, and under which the discoverer was accorded
priority in dealing with the indigenous peoples.28 Johnson v. McIntosh
made European discovery a seminal property event as well as an occa-
sion for the international rule of order. Marshall wrote:
The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired
by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy,
That law which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations be-
tween the conqueror and conquered, was incapable of application to a people
under such circumstances. The resort to some new and different rule, better
adapted to the actual state of things, was unavoidable. Every rule which can be
suggested will be found to be attended with great difficulty.
Id.
25. Marshall described the doctrine of discovery in Johnson v. McIntosh:
[I]t was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law
by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as
between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title to the govern-
ment by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making
the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing
settlements upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. It
was a right which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by
others, all assented.
Id. at 573.
26. Joseph William Singer, Well-Settled? The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian
Land Claims, 28 GA. L. R.Ev. 481,492-94 (1994) [hereinafter Increasing Weight of History].
27. See DAVID. H. GErc-s Er At., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 69 (4th ed. 1998).
28. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 573.
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which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of
acquiring. Such a right is no more incompatible with a
seisin in fee, than a lease for years, and might as effectually
bar an ejectment.29
Thus a facet of the English fee simple absolute, the legal or naked
fee title, was stripped from the indigenous inhabitant's ownership-
without their consent, knowledge, understanding, or even awareness-
at the moment of the Europeans' first physical encounter with the
North American lands. Marshall's conclusion of an instantaneous di-
vestment of legal estate in land, discerned in retrospect as occurring at
the first interface between native inhabitants and the invading emissar-
ies of European nations, was ostensibly a concession to the practical
needs of nineteenth century America, but it was, nonetheless, an ac-
ceptance, if not an outright endorsement, of racist and culturalist
premises.3"
Discovery, under Marshall's opinion, left the Indians with less
than the whole, but decidedly more than nothing. Marshall acknowl-
edged that their possession was a real interest, protectable against
virtually everyone-except the United States. The discoverer and its
successors held "an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest"3 and thus neither the
states, the local governments, nor private individuals could end the
Indians' lawful possession through unauthorized force or bargain. In
short, the tribes were protected, but "deemed incapable of transferring
the absolute title to others. 32
What, if any protection lay against the discoverer and its succes-
sors, themselves? If the United States decided to extinguish Indian title
with conquest rather than purchase, did the affected tribes have any
recourse? In a more modern sense of the question, would tribes dis-
possessed of aboriginal occupancy by the federal government have a
claim for a Fifth Amendment taking and for just compensation? 3 It
took over a century for the Supreme Court to answer this question,
and its negative conclusion was, in a legal or jurisprudential sense, even
more unmoored from precedent and, perhaps, logic than the decision
in Johnson v. McIntosh.
29. Id. at 592.
30. See RDBERT A.WILLIAMS,JI.,ThE AMERIcAN INDIAN IN EsTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 325
(1990). ("The Doctrine of Discovery and its discourse of conquest assert the West's lawful
power to impose its vision of truth on non-Western peoples through a racist, colonizing rule of
law.").
31. 21 U.S. at 587.
32. 21 U.S. at 591.
33. SeeTee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281 (1955).
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The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, denizens of the Pacific forests in Alaska
since well before the White incursions, were never at war with the
United States, were never signatories to a specific treaty, and thus were
neither the victims of forceful expulsion nor the beneficiaries of for-
mal recognized title. They became, instead, the victims of a legal
divestment in the form of a federal timber sale within their aboriginal
homeland.34 Did such absolute governmental dominion amount to an
unconstitutional taking, and to an obligation for just compensation?
The Supreme Court, in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,"s held that
it did not, because aboriginal title, though a right of exclusive posses-
sion protected under common law and statute against interference by
state, local, or private entities, was not property worthy of federal con-
stitutional protection.36 The Court said that unrecognized aboriginal
title was "mere possession ' 37 and that "[n]o case in this Court has ever
held that taking of Indian title or use by Congress required compensa-
tion.""
There were some distinct non-sequiturs in the Court's analysis. A
statement that aboriginal title was less than a full fee interest, and a
right only of possession does not necessarily avoid the issue of consti-
tutionally-compelled compensation. Clearly, there are less than fee
interests such as life estates, leases, and easements that are protected
against uncompensated federal confiscation.39 Such rights and the cases
that support them, however, have involved non-Indians.4" The Courts'
34. Id. at 273 n.1 (1955).The court described the governmental action as "a partial tak-
ing." Id.
35. 348 U.S. at 272.
36. The court stated:
This is not a property right but amounts to a right of occupancy which the sov-
ereign grants and protects against intrusion by third parties, but which right of
occupancy may be terminated and such lands filly disposed of by the sovereign
itself without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.
348 U.S. at 279.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 281.
39. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Leo Sheep v. United
States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
40. The court stated that:
The line of cases adjudicating Indian rights on American soil leads to the
conclusion that Indian occupancy, not specifically recognized as ownership by
action authorized by Congress, may be extinguished by the Government without
compensation. Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when
the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and
trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land.
348 U.S. at 288-90.
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basis of distinction may have been that all Indians were, or could have
been, conquered people. The Court seemed to believe that all tribes
were implicitly, if not literally, conquered at discovery, and thereafter
entitled only to a possession at the will or whim of a dominant sover-
eign.14 It may also have been that the Court, responding expediently to
"the actual state of things,' 42 did not wish to obligate the federal gov-
ernment to pay just compensation. at twentieth century fair market
prices in order to extinguish vast areas of Indian interests in the new
state of Alaska.43 In either event, the Supreme Court crafted some new
rules of property in order to justify its holding of non-compensability.
It is of, at least, academic interest to speculate whether the Court, in
redefining the limits of protectable property, went so far afield from
the common expectations as to run afoul of the taking clause guide-
lines emergent later in the bellwether case of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Commission.4  Justice Scalia, with non-Indian property owners
and their reasonable, investment-backed expectations on his mind, in-
timated that both legislatures and courts might be precluded by the
Constitution from redefining property, as an alternative to condemna-
tion or regulation, if such restatement was not grounded in the
common or settled law, and was not, therefore, foreseeable. 41 It would
seem more than a little ironic if the Supreme Court's holding of no
compensability in Tee-Hit-Ton could be retroactively regarded as itself
an unconstitutional taking.
A partial statutory redress for the loss of aboriginal possession was
enacted before the Tee-Hit-Ton case in the Indian Claims Commission
Act46 but was unavailable in the tribe's suit because the jurisdiction of
the Act was limited to pre-1946 claims. The Act provided, with respect
to claims on aboriginal lands, that an administrative tribunal could
make compensatory, non-interest bearing awards, based on the land's
market value at the time of the confiscation, for "taking by the United
41. See id. at 279.
42. SeeJohnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543,591 (1983).
43. Nell J. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign:Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 1215 (1980).According to Newton:
The rule in Tee-Hit-Ton may represent the court's attempt to save the public
treasury from having to pay out what were perceived as nearly ruinous damage
awards on claims pending before the Indian Claims Commission. By promulgat-
ing the rule in Tee-Hit-Ton, the court left Congress free to extinguish aboriginal
tide to Alaska, where the land's wealth in resources was just becoming known,
without incurring a duty to compensate the natives.
Id. at 1248.
44. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
45. Id. at 1029. ("Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (with-
out compensation), but must inhere in the tide itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place on land ownership.").
46. 25 U.S.C § 70 (1946).
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States, whether as a result of treaty, owned or otherwise, of lands
owned or occupied by the claimant without the payment for such
lands of compensation agreed to by the claimant."47
Proceedings before the Indian Claims Commission provided a num-
ber of questionable results where tribal groups, represented by aggressive,
self-interested non-Indian attorneys, made stipulations regarding the taking
of the land.1 These attorneys may have compromised not only the amount
of the monetary award but, even worse, some live title claims involving un-
extinguished possession.49 One of the more noted-or notorious-of the
Indian Claims Commission proceedings involved the lands of the Western
Shoshone, 0 and the ensuing litigation proved to be the springboard for the
unprecedented legal concept of individual aboriginal rights.
Individual, or miniaturized, entitlements to aboriginal rights, held to
inhere in particular individuals rather than the tribe, might well seem
anomalous in cultural setting where the relation of the people to the land
has been predominately collective." Traditional Indians may tend to regard
the private ownership of rights in land as exploitive or anti-
communitarian.5 2 Yet these individualized tendrils-overlooked or ignored
by the "courts of the conqueror"13-may well be of present and future sig-
nificance to the tribal setting. Like saplings clinging to earth and life after
the falling of the parent tree, they are rooted in the uses and traditions that
have nurtured the tribes since deep in the past. They thus may provide a
bridge, albeit a slender, swaying one, from the prehistoric roots, over the
travails of the present, and into a more hopeful future. In short, such rights
may provide a means to maintain the special connections of the people
with particular lands and sacred places.
Traditional Indian individuals, in contrast to the dominant society and
its unresolvable tension between personal aspiration and general welfare, are
not necessarily counterpoised against their collectivity. 4 The traditional In-
dians pursue salvation as a community rather than as separate individuals.5
They can thus hold individual aboriginal rights, not as pure personal privi-
lege, but in trust or stewardship for the tribe and its future1 6 The threads
47. 25 U.S.C § 70a(4) (1946).
48. See GETcEs Er AL., supra note 27, at 283-84.
49. Id.
50. See infra Section l.A.
51. See infra notes 144,176-80.
52. See infra notes 179-80.
53. See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U.L. R.EV.
753 (1992).
54. See FRANcis PAUL PRuCHA, TnE INDIANS IN AM~mcAN Socimn 53 (1985).
55. See CHARLES FWILKINSON, THE EAGLE BIRD 40-42 (1992); see also LAURA THOMPSON,
CULTURE IN Cmisis:A STUDY oF THE Hopi INDIANS 126 (1973).
56. See infra note 353.
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and filaments of the once vibrant pattern may ultimately recombine and
reweave into a living tissue of people united within communities and with
the sacred land.1
7
This Article will, in Section 1, deal with the legal development of the
concept of individual aboriginal rights. It will focus on the Western Sho-
shone land claims before the Indian Claims Commission, and the federal
government's trespass claims against the ranching operations of the redoubt-
able, irrepressible Dann sisters. Section II will explore the development and
utilization of the doctrine of individual aboriginal rights in a series of cases
involving the Dann sisters, subsequent Western Shoshone, and other efforts
by native people to secure subsistence hunting and fishing rights and pos-
session of or access to sacred sites. Section III will explore some related
concepts in western public land law. This Section suggests that custom, pre-
scription, access under nineteenth century self executing right of way
statutes, regulatory efforts, and administrative accommodation have pro-
vided at least some protection for the access of tribal peoples to sacred sites.
Section IV will speculate about the future expansion of such efforts, and
explore the possibility that the growth of colorblind equal protection doc-
trine will spread into the area of Indian law and threaten what Charles
Wilkinson has called the "measured separatism" of tribal sovereignty and
property."
I.THE DEVELOPING CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUAL ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
A. The Western Shoshone Experience Prior to the
Indian Claims Commission Act
When White men first arrived in the Great Basin, lying between the
Rockies and the Sierra Nevada, they found the Newe, or Western
Shoshone, living much the same as they had for the preceding millennia.
The small, autonomous bands, usually composed of extended families, s9
moved lightly over the pinion-crested mountain ranges and the sage
brush valleys of the region that the Whites ultimately called Nevada. The
Western Shoshone were peaceful hunters and gathers who subsisted on
deer, rabbit, wild fowl, and pine-nuts, and who avoided warfare with
other tribes.60 The balance point for life in this arid high desert area is
narrow and precarious, but the Western Shoshone, a deeply spiritual
57. See COLLIER, supra note 4, at 7-16.
58. See CHARLES F soLKINSON, AMERIcAN INDIANS, TWE, AND THE LAW 14-19, 106-11
(1987).
59. David Hurst Thomas et al., Western Shoshone, in GREAT BASIN 274-79 (Warren L.
D'Azevedo ed. 1986). The group structure later proves to be doctrinally significant as the con-
cept of individual aboriginal rights emerges out of the experience of the Dann Family, and its
use of the land prior to 1934. See discussion infra at Part I.C.
60. See STEVENJ. CRuM,THE ROAD ON WHICH WE CAME (1994).
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people, loved the land, respected it, and kept an ongoing, workable
harmony, which stretched from the far reaches of prehistory into relatively
recent historical times. Then the White men came, first from the south
through Mexico, and then from the east.
The explorers, miners, trappers, soldiers, and later, the roads, wire,
cattle, and permanent settlement affected Indian society and the hunting
economy.' The Western Shoshone were forced to reorganize and form
larger groups for defensive and retaliatory reasons.62 Skirmishes between
the Whites and Indians became more frequent, especially after the tribes-
men were able to acquire equalizing technology in the form of guns and
horses.63
The 1840s proved to be a critical divide. Americans displaced Mexi-
can sovereignty in the West after a pretext war. Miners discovered gold in
California and in western Nevada's Comstock Lode. Tensions in the
North and South over slavery began to heat up, and movement into the
West accelerated.64 After passage of the Homestead Act and the Pacific
Railway Act in 186265 and in anticipation of even more emigration and
conflict after the Civil War ended, the United States entered into a series
of treaties with the Great Basin people. One of the treaties was called the
Treaty of Ruby Valley, or more formally, the Treaty with the Western Sho-
shone.6
The treaty, signed on October 1, 1863 by twelve bands of the West-
ern Shosone,67 was-and remains-enigmatic. The agreement calls for
"peace and friendship" and a cessation from "hostilities and depredations
upon the emigrant trains, the mail, and telegraph lines, and upon the citi-
zens of the United States within their country '" 68 The reference to
"emigrant" trains and "their country" would seem to acknowledge the
ownership of the bands of the Western Shoshone. The agreement also
states that "the boundaries of the country claimed and occupied by said
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. at 18-19.
63. Id. at 18.
64. See PAULA MITCHELL MARKS, IN A BARREN LAND 128-45 (1998).
65. See PAUL W GAmES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELoPMENT 362-77, 394-99
(1968).
66. Treaty with the Western Shoshoni, October 1, 1863, U.S.-W Shoshoni, 18 Stat. 689
[hereinafter Treaty of Ruby Valley].
67. In spite of the multiple signatories, the treaty did not represent the agreement of all
or most of the Western Shoshone. In fact, three quarters of the people living within the treaty
boundaries were unrepresented at the negotiations. See CRUM, supra note 60, at 26.The ability of
a compliant minority to legally or politically bind even an unwilling majority has been the
hallmark of much federal Indian law, not only in the case of treaties, but also with respect to
organization under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934) and claims under
Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70-70V (1946).
68. Treaty of RubyValley, supra note 66, art. 1.
[VOL. 9:323
Individual Aboriginal Rights
bands are defined and described by them as follows, ' 69 and makes refer-
ence to "Shoshone country, now or hereafter used by [W]hite men."70
The main thrust of the treaty would appear to be the establishment
of rights of non-Indian passage over, and limited use on, the lands of the
Western Shoshone.7 ' The document does, however, also seem to be in-
consistent with a full acknowledgement of Western Shoshone sovereignty
and proprietary interests, as it contains an agreement on the part of the
bands that:
Whenever the President of the United States shall deem it ex-
pedient for them to abandon the roaming life, which they now
led, and become herdsmen or agriculturalists, he is hereby au-
thorized to make such reservations for their use as he may
deem necessary, within the country above described and they
do hereby agree to remove their camps to such reservations as
he may indicate, and to reside and remain therein.
72
Did the Treaty of Ruby Valley recognize Western Shoshone title in
the land and thereby create a constitutionally protected property interest,
or did it extinguish the Indians' possessory title and leave them with
nothing for their 24,000,000-acre area of aboriginal use and occupation
except a subsequent statutory claim for monetary compensation? As befits
the conflicting and contradictory language, the courts have declared that
the treaty did neither.
The conclusion that the Treaty of Ruby Valley failed to recognize
the Western Shoshone lands was made indirectly, as dicta, although the
inference seems clear enough. The Supreme Court decided in Northwest-
ern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States3 that the Box Elder Treaty, 4
69. Id. at art. 5.
70. Id. at art. 2.
71. Id. at art. 3-4.
72. Id. at art. 6.
73. 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
74. Box Elder TreatyJuly 30,1863, 13 Stat. 663.
SPRING 20041
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which was similar to the Treaty of Ruby Valley in timing, purpose, and
language s7 could not be interpreted as a recognition of title.76
The more long-standing and technically unresolved question is
whether the treaty could be taken as an extinguishment of Western
Shoshone aboriginal title. The Indians deny this vehemently, although
some legends seem to support the idea that the treaty was imposed on
them rather than negotiated.77 What is clear is that, following the Civil
75. Justice Reed, writing for the majority, declared:
As the distances made it impracticable to gather the Shoshone Nation into
one council for treaty purposes, the commissioners made five treaties in an en-
deavor to dear up the difficulties in the Shoshone county... It is sufficient here
to say that by the treaties the Indians agreed not to molest travelers, stage coaches,
telegraph lines or projected railroads. All the Shoshone treaties were similar in
form. They show that the boundaries claimed, as petitioner points out, covered
the entire Shoshone country. After all five were negotiated Commissioner Doty
was able to trace a rough map of the Shoshone country to show the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs "the exterior boundaries of the territories claimed by the
Shoshonees in their recent treaties, as also the lines of the county occupied by dif-
ferent portions of the tribe indicated upon it as correctly as the map will allow."
He had asked Indian Affairs for the map upon which this information was traced
"to show the boundaries of the country ceded by the Shoshones."
324 U.S. at 341-43.
76. According to the Court:
It seems to us clear from the circumstances leading up to and following the
execution of the Box Elder Treaty that the parties did not intend to recognize or
acknowledge by that treaty the Indian title to the lands in question.Whether the
lands were in fact held by the Shoshones by Indian title from occupancy or oth-
erwise or what rights flow to the Indians from such title is not involved. Since the
rights, if any the Shoshones have, did not arise under or grow out of the Box
Elder treaty, no recovery may be had under the jurisdictional act.
324 U.S. at 354. It is also noteworthy that the case was a prelude to Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States,
348 U.S. 272,281 (1955).Justice Reed said, with respect to the extinguishments of aboriginal
tide:
Since Johnson v. McIntosh, decided in 1823, gave rationalization to the appro-
priation of Indian lands by the [W]hite man's government, the extinguishment of
Indian title by that sovereignty has proceeded, as a political matter, without any
admitted legal responsibility in the sovereign to compensate the Indian for his
loss. Exclusive title to the lands passed to the [W]hite discoverers, subject to the
Indian title with power in the white sovereign alone to extinguish that right by
"purchase or by conquest."The [W]hites enforced their claims by the sword and
occupied the lands as the Indians abandoned them.
Id. at 339 (citations omitted).
77. FrankTemoke, Sr.,Traditional Chief of theWestern Shoshone until his death in 1994,
wrote:
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War, Whites moved into the area to settle, to mine, to graze their cattle,
and to build the railroad lines.78 Though the Western Shoshone were not
completely displaced, their hunting and gathering lifestyle was affected-
native grasses were consumed, pinion groves were leveled, and game was
depleted-and many were forced to adjust to an agricultural or industrial
livelihood.79
Though some of the Western Shoshone moved to the small reserva-
tions established by the federal government in Nevada after 1877,80 most
remained on the aboriginal lands that they believed were assured to them
under the Treaty of Ruby Valley."t The land that they resided on, hunted,
and ran cattle over, was considered an unreserved public domain by the
United States and, prior to 1934, was wholly unmanaged. Indeed, there
was an implied license to use the open range,82 and the Western Shoshone
were able to graze much of Central Nevada with no substantial interfer-
ence. The Taylor Grazing Act of 193483 (TGA) brought the possibility of
basic management to the public rangelands and gave the Secretary of the
Interior the authority to establish grazing districts and regulate usage. The
And so it was that at the appointed time the Indians together with the chieft did
come to this place in Ruby Valley and they came unarmed and the soldiers to-
gether with the government representatives also came but the soldiers had rifles
which they stacked in bunches. So when the Indians had all gathered, the soldiers
grabbed the rifles and killed an Indian which they had previously captured and
brought with them. Then they cut the Indian up and put him in a huge iron pot
which they had in those days and they cooked him and then the soldiers aimed
their rifles at the heads of the people and forced the people to eat some of this
man they had killed. Men, women and children were all forced to eat some of
this human flesh while the soldiers held their guns on the people. And it was after
this terrible thing which the [Wihite man did to our people that the Treaty of
1863 was signed. So it is hard for us of the Western Shoshone people to under-
stand why the [W]hite man doesn't wish to keep this Treaty. And why the
government insists through its agents and attorneys that this Treaty is no good.
Frank Temoke, Sr., Ruby Valley Treaty Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada, Historical
Commemoration, October 1, 1863, at http://www.yvwiiusdinvnohii.net/history/
1863rubyhist.htm.
78. CRuM, supra note 60, at 30.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 35, 43; see also Treaty of RubyValley, supra note 66, at art. 6.
81. CRUM, supra note 60, at 59.
82. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).The Court stated:
We are of opinion that there is an implied license, growing out of the custom of
nearly a hundred years, that the public lands of the United States, especially those
in which the native grasses are adapted to the growth and fattening of domestic
animals, shall be free to the people who seek to use them where they are left
open and unenclosed, and no act of government forbids this use.
Id. at 326.
83. 43 U.S.C. % 315-315(r) (1934).
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initial efforts at control by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) were
rudimentary at best.8" At mid-century, the Western Shoshone remained in
actual, unchallenged possession of several million Nevada acres,8 and in
theoretical possession of nearly sixteen million acres of federal lands that
had not been used or taken by Whites in their various economic endeav-
ors.
86
It is significant to note that, prior to 1934, a large number of West-
ern Shoshone extended families lived on the land in a social, political, and
economic state fundamentally similar to how they lived before the White
incursion. True, the specific modes of production may have changed from
predominantly hunting and gathering to primarily agriculture and graz-
ing, but what had not changed was the decentralized nature of the
economy, cohering around an extended family or band, and the intimate
ties of the groups to particular places and land. While the United States
may have been a dominant sovereign and the BLM may have been the
nominal regulatory authority it remained arguable that the vestigial fed-
eral control in the form of grazing districts, without more, could not be
deemed a clear cut extinguishment of Indian aboriginal title.7
B. The Indian Claims Commission Proceedings
The Indian Claims Commission Act 8 was an amalgamated product,
forged from a variety of sources and motives. Some of these were diver-
gent, if not incompatible. From one angle, the Act seemed a good faith
attempt to improve America's moral posture regarding its oft-displaced
native inhabitants and to compensate them for dispossession of tribal lands
and rights. 9 From another approach, the Act may have been an effort to
hot-wire moribund, post-war reservation economies with unrestricted
cash awards. 9 Finally, the Act could be seen as terminationist in direction
84. See GEORGE C. COGGINS Er AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND ANTD RESOURCE LAW,
781-86 (5th ed. 2002).
85. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 734 (The Michie Co. 1991)
(1973).
86. JERRY MANDER, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SACRED 308 (1991).
87. Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to In-
dian Lands, 41 A.L.R. FED. 425 (1997).
88. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 25 U.S.C. 5§ 70a-70 v-3 (2001) (omit-
ted upon termination of the Indian Claims Commission on September 30, 1978).
89. Sandra C. Danforth, Repaying Historic Debts: The Indian Claims Commission, 49 N.
D. L. REv. 359, 366 (1973).
90. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 723.
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and reflective of a desire to settle federal accounts with the tribes and pre-
pare them for the cutting of the ties of obligation."
In accord with the thrust towards justice, the Act expanded the fed-
eral jurisdiction over the types of tribal claims that had long been
frustrated on the basis of sovereign immunity, or the lack of treaty or
statutory recognition.92 Simultaneously, however, and with an eye toward
assimilation, economy, and termination, the Act implicitly limited the
scope of relief to the award of monetary compensation rather than the
return of land or the confirmation of title.93 Federal courts compounded
this effect by holding that the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) was the
exclusive forum for Indian land claims.14 Consequently, tribes were often
forced to forego claims for quieting title and to bring live disputes before
the Commission rather than the federal district courts.9" The ICC thus
became an inescapable conduit for Indian land contests and a compactor
that reduced even viable claims for present possession of particular lands
into fungible claims for deeply discounted monetary relief 6 The ICC, in
short, became an engine for the consumption of Indian land at nineteenth
century interest-free prices.
A parasitic accompaniment to the exclusively monetary focus was
the overreaching of the big-city lawyers, whose eyes were fixed on the
contingency fee of ten percent of the tribe's recovery98 and the possibility
of subsequent Indian resource business, such as brokering below-market
leases for Indian minerals.99 Such lawyers often attempted to find compli-
ant tribal members-the modern day equivalent of the notorious
"government chiefs" 1 --- that would be willing, even if not authorized, to
speak, sue, stipulate, or settle for the whole group." '
91. CRUM, supra note 60, at 123; see also DONALD L. Fixico, TERMINATION AND RE-
LOCATION 41(1986).
92. Danforth, supra note 89, at 362-63.
93. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 27, at 280.
94. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 735-36.
95. See, e.g., Ogalala Sioux Tribe v. United States, 650 E2d 140, 143-43 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (holding that the Indian Claims Commission Act
provided an exclusive remedy for claims dealing with the taking of Indian lands); see also
Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 E2d 1455, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding
that even live title disputes should be filed under the Indian Claims Commission Act);
Richard Hughes, Indian Law, 18 N.M. L. REv. 403, 410 (1988) (criticizing this interpreta-
tion).
96. GETCHES Er AL., supra note 27, at 281; MANNER, supra note 86, at 307-08.
97. GErCHES Er AL., supra note 27, at 281.
98. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 27, at 283-84; MANNER, supra note 86, at 306.
99. CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAu 284-87 (1999).
100. Federal government officials charged with treaty negotiations often selected
Indian individuals who were friendly or corruptible, designated them as "chiefs," regardless
of their stature or authority in their tribe, and conducted transactions purporting to bind
tribes not present. See Wilkinson &Volkman, supra note 16, at 608-19.
101. MANDER, supra note 86, at 306.
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The jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission was limited to
tribal claims and individuals, and even those with compelling tales of
wrongdoing by the government had no standing before the tribunal."2
Yet, the seeds of some individual rights and possible relief came out of
these adjudications of tribal claims. The development of the concept of
individual aboriginal rights began with the Western Shoshone claims be-
fore the Indian Claims Commission.
In August 1951, as the jurisdictional window of the Indian Claims
Commission Act was about to close, 3 the Western Shoshone, represented
by the Te-moak Band and Ernest Wilkinson of the Wilkinson, Cragin and
Barker law firm, filed a claim for compensation before the ICC.1°4 The
Te-moak Band, though organized under the Indian Reorganization Act' °
(IRA) and recognized by the federal government, actually spoke for only a
portion of the Western Shoshone 116 who, in general, rejected not only the
102. See W Shoshone Legal Def. and Educ. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F2d 495 (Ct.
Cl. 1976) [hereinafter Western Shoshone Case].
A claim under the Claims Commission Act is not an aggregation of individ-
ual claims but a group claim on behalf of a tribe, band or other identifiable
group. The suing claimant represents that group interest, and it is reasonable
to say that at least prima facie the organized entity "recognized by the Secre-
tary of the Interior as having authority to represent such [claiming] tribe,
band, or group" should be the exclusive suing party. An Indian claim under
the Act is unlike a class suit in that there is no necessity that the position of
each individual member of the group be represented; it is only the group
claim which need be put forward. If there are circumstances in which the
organized entity fails properly to represent the group, the normal method of
redress is through the internal mechanism of the organized entity.
Id. at 503-04 (citations omitted).
103. Claims accruing on or prior to August 13, 1946 were to be handled by the ICC
if the claims were filed on or prior to August 13, 1951. See Indians Claims Commission
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 70a. Claims arising after August 13, 1946 were to be within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1505 (West 1994);
Navajo Tribe v. United States, 586 E2d 192, 199 (Ct.C1. 1978); see also JUDITH ROYSTER &
MICHAEL C. BLUM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCE LAW 127-28 (2002).
104. Wilkinson was instrumental in the passage of the Indian Claims Commission
Act. See Creek Nation v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 483, 483 n.5 (1964). Wilkinson was
later replaced by Robert W Barker. See CRUM, supra note 60, at 131. Reid P. Chambers, in
turn, replaced Barker. See Te-moak Band of W. Shoshone Indians, Nev. v. United States,
593 E2d 994, 997 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
105. The organizational provisions of 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 enable a tribe or band to
adopt a constitution by majority vote and submit it to the Secretary of the Interior for
approval.
106. The ICC found, in 1962, that the Te-moak Bands of Western Shoshone Indians
was organized under "the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984," and was rec-
ognized by the Secretary of the Interior as having the authority to maintain a suit. Western
Shoshone v. United States, 11 Ind. Cl. Comm. 387, 388 (1957). The Te-moak Band was
thus deemed authorized to sue "for and on behalf of the aboriginal Western Shoshone
Identifiable Group." Western Shoshone Case, 531 E2d 495, 499 (Ct. Cl. 1976). As authorized
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IRA, but also the idea of a monetary claim for their aboriginal lands.' 7 The
resisters, composed largely of traditionals, felt that the Western Shoshone
still owned and occupied substantial portions of Nevada and they did not
wish to venture into an ICC thicket that seemed to hold no real promise of
a confirmed tribal land base. 8
In 1957, the Western Shoshone's claim for lost lands, backed by an-
thropological evidence of aboriginal possession,' was finally presented
for the often-glacial consideration of the ICC. Five years later, the com-
mission concluded that the Western Shoshone had held aboriginal
possession to 24,396,403 acres within the Great Basin."°The Commission
further found that the settlers, miners, railroad men, and other non-
Indians gradually encroached on this possession. Then, in 1966, though no
formal congressional act of extinguishment was confirmed by the ICC,"
and although the encroachment was by no means total, the Te-moak
Band attorneys stipulated with the government that a valuation date for
lands taken in Nevada would be July 1, 1872.12
A stipulation to the extinguishment of aboriginal title by private en-
croachment, even if such encroachment may have been encouraged by
the implications of federal treaties and land disposition laws, was inconsis-
tent with the holding in Johnson v. McIntosh"3 and the prohibitions of the
representatives for the larger group before the ICC, the Te-moak Bands could be displaced
as the exclusive representative only on a showing of"fraud, collusion, or laches." Id.
107. See CRUM, supra note 60, at 126-32.
108. Id. at 124.
109. Wilkinson hired Omer Stewart of the University of Colorado, who provided
evidence of the Western Shoshone's exclusive occupation and use of the Central Great
Basin. Id. at 131.
110. Western Shoshone Case, 531 F2d at 496.
111. United States v. Dann, 706 F2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Dann I].The
Court held that: "aboriginal title had not been extinguished as a matter of law by applica-
tion of the public land laws, by creation of the Duck Valley Reservation, or by inclusion of
the disputed lands in a grazing district and issuance of a grazing permit pursuant to the
Taylor Grazing Act." Id. at 933.
112. Western Shoshone Case, 531 F2d at 497.
113. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); supra notes 26-27, 30. In United
States v. Sante Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941), Justice Douglas, in upholding a
tribal claim to unextinguished aboriginal possession on a railroad land grant, declared that
only Congress could extinguish Indian tide:
Extinguishment of Indian tide based on aboriginal possession is of course a
different matter. The power of Congress in that regard is supreme. The man-
ner, method and time of such extinguishment raise political not justiciable
issues. As stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh, "the exclu-
sive right of the United States to extinguish" Indian title has never been
doubted. And whether it be done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the
exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or other-
wise, its justness is not open to inquiry in the courts.
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 347 (1941) (citations omitted).
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Non Intercourse Acts.11 The federal common law, embraced in Johnson,
and the express legislative statements confirm that Congress is the exclu-
sive architect of extinguishments and that private efforts without specific
authorization are ineffectual and possibly illegal. ' The ICC was appar-
ently untroubled by the legally unsupportable stipulation in the Western
Shoshone case because, for one thing, neither the Indians nor the United
States actually contested the extinguishment issue. For another reason, the
ICC's consistent orientation was toward the monetary settlement of land
claims, rather than the confirmation of unextinguished tribal title or pos-
session. The trouble with this cozy willingness to waive the law stemmed
from the fact that the stipulation encompassed not only land lost, but land
still within the tribe's actual or constructive possession.'
1 6
The sawing on the limb upon which the tribe was seated reached
the crisis stage in 1972 when the ICC calculated the Western Shoshone's
total loss, at 1872 non-interest-bearing prices, to be around twenty-six
million dollars."17 With the final and formal dispossession of their entire
aboriginal domain looming before them, including the lands currently
occupied, and with the Te-moak Band asleep at the wheel, a group of
traditional Western Shoshones attempted to intervene in the ICC pro-
ceedings and raise the argument that the tribe still held unextinguished
aboriginal title to some twelve million acres." 8 The ICC rejected the at-
114. The Act stated:
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, was ex-
tended over "the Indian tribes in the Territories of New Mexico and Utah
by" [S] 7 of the Act of February 27, 1851, 9 Stat. 574, 587. The 1834 Act,
which derived from the Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137, made it an offense
to drive stock to range or feed "on any land belonging to any Indian or In-
dian tribe, without the consent of such tribe"; gave the superintendent of
Indian affairs authority "to remove from the Indian country all persons
found therein contrary to law;" made it unlawful to settle on "any lands be-
longing, secured, or granted"... "from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians."
The Act of 1851 obviously did not create any Indian right of occupancy
which did not previously exist. But it plainly indicates that in 1851 Congress
desired to continue in these territories the unquestioned general policy of
the Federal government to recognize such right of occupancy. As stated by
Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, the Indian trade and inter-
course acts "manifestly consider the several Indian nations in distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, which [sic] which their author-
ity is exclusive and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries,
which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States."
Id. at 347-48 (citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 734.
117. Western Shoshone Case, 531 E2d at 497.
118. CRUM, supra note 60, at 180; see Te-moak Band ofW Shoshone Indians v. United
States, 593 F2d 984, 996 (Ct. Cl. 1979) [hereinafter Te-moak Band]; Western Shoshone Case,
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tempt to intervene and their judgment was sustained by the United States
Court of Claims, which viewed the intervention attempt as merely an
intertribal squabble over "litigation strategy."'119
The Te-moak Band, shaken into wakefulness by the failed interven-
tion of the traditionals, then sought to change its own approach. It wanted
to retroactively limit the scope of its prior stipulation and to seek, addi-
tionally, a declaration that the Western Shoshone still held unextinguished
aboriginal title to twelve million acres.1 2' To this end, the Te-moak's fired
their original lawyers and hired the legendary Reid Chambers, a foremost
Indian law scholar and litigator. Chambers's efforts to halt or shift the
ICC's quarter-century of momentum building, however, went for naught.
The Commission found that it was too late in the day to adjudicate the
case on a new theory, and the Court of Claims agreed.' The Commis-
sion, having denied the Te-moak's attempt to stay the proceedings, then
entered its final judgment in 1977,12 and the Court of Claims, also agree-
ing with this conclusion, suggested that if the Western Shoshone were
unhappy with the cash-for-land result, they could appeal to Congress to
"undo the course of litigation."' '23
C. The Dann Litigation and the Establishment
of Individual Aboriginal Rights
After an executive order created the DuckValley Reservation on the
Nevada-Idaho border in 1877, the United States occasionally tried to per-
suade the nomadic Western Shoshone bands to relocate; however, only
about a third complied.124 The majority remained on their Great Basin
531 F2d at 503.The interveners also charged that there was collusion between the Te-moak
Bands and the government to treat the title as extinguished. Te-Moak Band, 593 F2d at 996.
119. Western Shoshone Case, 531 E2d at 503.
120. Te-moak Band, 593 F2d at 997.
121. Id. at 997-98.
122. The ICC's monetary award to the Western Shoshones was placed in trust in
1979 and, with accumulated interest, now amounts to around 138 million dollars. The
tribe has continuously refused to participate in any plan for distribution, fearing that ac-
ceptance would preclude any future claims to the land. In recent years opposition to this
stance has emerged. A substantial segment of the tribe, feeling that the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985) effectively ends tribal claims to the
land and aware that per capita payouts from the fund now approach $20,000 for each eli-
gible member, has indicated a desire to distribute the trust fund. Senate Bill 958, the
Western Shoshone Distribution bill, was considered by Congress in 2002, but died on
November 14, 2002, in the House of Representatives. See Valerie Tallman, Shoshone Pay-
out Bill Dead, DeathValley. U.S. Forums, (2003), at http://death-valley.us/article278.htm.
123. Te-moak Band, 593 F.2d at 999.
124. CRUM, supra note 60, at 43. ("This government effort failed because the Sho-
shones were too deeply attached to particular places where their ancestors had lived. As a
result, only one-third moved to Duck Valley, while the other two-thirds remained at or
near their native places.").
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aboriginal range, and this traditional life-pattern continued on into the
twentieth century.2 But it did not continue unimpeded. The non-
reservation Indians had a difficult time economically, as the hunting and
gathering patterns were increasingly disrupted."6 The Indians turned
more to ranching and grazing on the unreserved and unregulated public
domain. '27
One of the Western Shoshone who undertook ranching on the
open range of Crescent Valley was Dewey Dann, who began herding cat-
tle in the 1920s.'28 Cattle ranching involves two distinct aspects of usage
and claims of property right. The rancher first asserts an exclusive posses-
sion over the ranch's base land-the residence, barns, pens, and
curtilege-and then exercises a usufruct or non-exclusive usage of lands
over which the cattle graze. 121
Sometime, in the late 1920s or early 1930s,'3° Dewey, and his wife
Sophie Dann acquired a fee patent to 160 acres under the Homestead
Laws,"' and also purchased 640 additional acres from the Southern Pacific
Railroad.'32 These fee lands, superimposed over lands claimed by Sho-
shones as aboriginal right, served as the base of the Dann Ranch, which
extended its grazing operations over the adjacent and unregulated federal
public lands. Free passage over and use of the public lands was, however,
about to change. In 1934 the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act 3 3 brought
the open range to at least a theoretical close and greatly limited the op-
portunities for acquiring title under the homesteading acts.13 ' The open
range was placed into large, loosely operated management units called
125. Id. at 59.
126. Id. at 63.
127. Id. at 63-66. Withdrawal of the public domain from disposition and unregulated
use began with the reservation ofYellowstone National Park in 1872 and rapidly expanded
with the General Revision Act of 1891, which authorized the reservation of timber lands
as national forests. See I GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCEs LAW §§ 2.9-2.14 (2000).
128. United States v. Dann, 873 E2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Dann
IM].
129. Id.; see also United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985); United States v. Cramer,
216 U.S. 219 (1923).
130. "The district court found that Dewey and Sophie Dann obtained their home-
stead patent 'in the 1930's.' The government asserts that 'the patent was issued in 1928."
Dann 111, 873 F2d at 1193, n. 2.
131. Id. at 1193; see also GATEs, supra note 65, at 495-529.
132. GATEs, supra note 65, at 495-529; Dann III, 873 F2d at 1193.
133. 43 U.S.C. §5 315-315(r) (1934).
134. See Stewart v. Penny, 238 E Supp. 821 (D. Nev. 1965); COGGINS ET AL., supra
note 84.
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grazing districts. Grazing was transformed from an unrestricted privilege3 '
into a special permit use, necessitating user payment and a conditioned
approval from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).' 36
In 1936, Dewey Dann obtained grazing permits from the BLM to
cover lands used by his ranching operations.'37 He held these permits and
paid the fees until his death. Dann's eldest daughter, Mary, the successor to
the ranch, began herding in the 1940s and was joined a decade later by
her sister, Carrie. The Dann sisters did not seek or receive grazing permits;
they claimed, instead, that they were entitled to graze the federal lands in
accord with Western Shoshone aboriginal rights reflected in the Treaty of
Ruby Valley. Their grazing activities overlapped and conflicted with other
area ranches who had subsequently acquired permits to graze the lands
once held under permit by Dewey Dann.131
In 1979, the United States filed suit against the Dann sisters in fed-
eral district court, alleging that their continued grazing on federal lands
without a Taylor Grazing Act permit was a trespass and that the govern-
ment was entitled to an injunction and damages.'39 The Danns responded
that the Western Shoshone Tribe held aboriginal title to the contested
area since time immemorial, and as tribal members, they could use the
lands under tribal law and custom and need not comply with BLM regu-
lations. The federal government contended that the issue of whether the
ICC had extinguished the tribe's aboriginal title had been decided by the
ICC and the district court concurred. 140
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that the ICC
decision on extinguishment was neither final as a matter of procedure, nor
correct as a matter of substantive law.14' While the remanded case was
pending in the district court, the Western Shoshone claims proceeding
ended in 1979 with the ICC certification of an award of twenty-six
135. Wayne Hage, and other Nevada ranchers, have long insisted that unrestricted
grazing of the public lands was a matter of right. See WILLIAM PERRY PENDLEY, WAR ON
THE WEST 76-79 (1995). The legal basis for this position has been clearly refuted. See
United States v. Gardner, 107 F3d. 1314 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 264 (1997);
see also Robert Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on the Federal Lands, 45 U. KAN. L. Rv. 647
(1997).
136. 43 U.S.C. § 315b; see United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488,489 (1973); E. LOUISE
PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 214-24 (1951) (cited in COGGINS Er AL.,
supra note 84, at 133-35).
137. United States v. Dann, 873 F2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1989).
138. Id.; see also Alves v. United States, 133 F3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
139. Dann III, 873 E2d at 1191 (federal acreage at issue in the case was about 5120
acres); see United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 43 (1985).
140. See United States v. Dann, No. R-74-60 (Jan. 5, 1977) (cited in United States v.
Dann, 470 U.S. 39, 44 (1985)).
141. United States v. Dann, 572 F2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Dann 1]
("[W]hatever may have been the implicit assumptions of both the United States and the
Shoshone Tribes during the litigation ... the extinguishment question was not necessarily
in issue, it was not actually litigated, and it has not been decided.") Id. at 226-27.
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million dollars. 142 According to the district court, this certification, if not
the prior private encroachment or the federal land laws, operated as an
extinguishment of aboriginal title-and as a preclusion of the Dann's
defense to trespass. 143 The Ninth Circuit again reversed, stating that the
Western Shoshone were not barred procedurally and could raise the
substantive issue of extinguishment.14 More specifically, the court stated
that the doctrine of issue preclusion did not bar the Danns because the
precise issue of extinguishment had been stipulated to before the ICC,
but had not been actually litigated. 45 The statutory bar, contained within
the Indian Claims Commission Act, did not operate against the Danns,
despite the ICC's certification of the award, because there was no plan of
distribution for the award and no actual payment to the tribe. 4 6 Finally,
with the procedural hurdles cleared, the court concluded that, as a matter
of law, there could be no extinguishment of aboriginal title without 'a
clear expression of congressional intent, and this was not demonstrated by
the administrative establishment of the DuckValley Reservation or by the
general operation of the public land laws.
47
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals with a bloodless, formalistic conclusion that the ICC's
certification of an award to the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
was dispositive of the Western Shoshone's tribal claim to aboriginal title
142. See United States v. Dann, 706 E2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1983); Dann III, 873 at
1192.
143. United States v. Dann, No. R-74-60 (April 25, 1980) (cited in United States v.
Dann, 470 U.S. 39,44 (1985)).
144. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 923.
145. Id. at 924.
146. Judge Canby asserted:
Although funds have been appropriated and credited to an interest-bearing
Treasury account in the name of the Tribe, no monies have actually passed
into the hands of the Western Shoshone group or its members, nor have any
been used for their benefit. Distribution and use of the awarded funds can
only take place pursuant to a plan of use or distribution timely prepared by
the Secretary of Interior and acquiesced in by Congress, or by separate legis-
lation. We are advised that in the present case no timely plan was submitted,
so that separate legislation will be required. Congress therefore retains sig-
nificant control over the claims process until the distribution scheme is
actually put into effect.We conclude that "payment" has not occurred within
the meaning of section 70u(a) until Congress has taken its final look at the
award and has either permitted a plan of distribution to become effective
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1403 or has legislated one. One reason for so con-
cluding is that the ordinary meaning of"payment" does not seem satisfied by
a transfer of funds that leaves such significant legal blocks in the way of de-
livery to the payee.
Id. at 925-26 (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 933.
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and simultaneously preclusive of the Dann sisters' reliance on tribal title as
a defense to federal charges of trespass. 4 The Court held that the Indian
Claims Commission Act's chief purpose was final disposition of Indian
claims and, therefore, payment to the GAO should be interpreted to bar
further litigation concerning a tribe's aboriginal rights, even in cases
where Congress had not yet adopted a formal plan for distribution of the
award. 49 The Court avoided consideration of the federal common law of
extinguishment, voiced no opinion on the Western Shoshone's now un-
raisable claim that no extinguishment had, in fact, taken place, and
demonstrated no concern that the Western Shoshone's pyrrhic (and unde-
sired) victory of compensation at nineteenth century prices was achieved
at the cost of land they were actually using.
But the Supreme Court tossed a bone to the otherwise luckless
Danns: the residual possibility of individual aboriginal rights to graze at
least some of the lands in question.' 0 Though the Court cited some
precedent for its suggestion,'' these cases were far from formulaic, and
not immediately applicable to the Danns' situation.
Before turning to the lower court's embellishment and particulariza-
tion of the concept of individual aboriginal rights, it is worth a
preliminary exploration into the Supreme Court's somewhat cryptic ref-
erence. Indeed, individual aboriginal rights seem in some sense to be
anomalous or even oxymoronic. From an Indian standpoint, relations with
particular lands were preeminently collective.- 2 Individuals and families
within the tribal context could have the ability to use discrete portions of
148. See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985).
149. See id. at 45.
150. See id. at 49.
151. Id. at 50 (citing Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923) and United States
v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941)).
152. JAMAKE HIGHWATER,THE PRIMAL MIND 127-28 (1981); see HUGHES, supra note 2,
at 61; see also COLLIER, GLEAMING WAY, supra note 7, at 24. Donald Hughes wrote:
Land in the Indian view was not "owned" in the sense that word had in
Western European societies; rather it was held in common. In the widest
meaning, Indians felt that all living beings share the land, and that includes
plants and animals as well as human beings. But in a more local sense, owner-
ship was tribal and the land was considered to belong to the community
even when it was used by families or individuals. Among Indians, coopera-
tion and group interests predominated, particularly where ecological
conditions meant subsistence living in a difficult environment. They were
tolerant of individual desires, appreciative of individual contributions to the
group, and slow to use sanctions against individuals, but they were not indi-
vidualists. An Indian felt himself or herself primarily as part of the family,
clan or tribe, and the world of life. Most ceremonies and economic activities
were done by cooperative groups. A competitive attitude was regarded as an-
tisocial or malevolent. Generosity, hospitality, and the customary exchange of
gifts provided for sharing food and goods throughout the local group.
HUGHES, supra note 2, at 61.
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the land, but the reversion after cessation remained with the people.' 3 As
a matter of expediency, if not political theory and property law, the invad-
ing Europeans and expansionist Americans postulated that land interests
were held and transferable by the tribe rather than individuals.' The Su-
preme Court, in its development of the federal Indian law, has tended (or
preferred) to view Indians' assertable land claims, whether aboriginal,
treaty-based, or statutory, as tribal issues, with individual rights of user
subsumed in the tribal context.' 5
Yet, the Supreme Court in United States v. Dann skirted these prece-
dents and intimated that a concept of individual aboriginal rights could be
linked to the 1923 case of Cramer v. United States. 6 In Cramer, the Court
held that three individual Indians had a legally protectable interest against a
subsequent railroad grantee and its successors, despite the fact that the prior
Indian possession was not in accord with the requirements of the homestead
acts.' 7 The Indians were, in fact, part of a tribe and were within an area cov-
ered by a negotiated treaty that was pending for ratification at the time of
the 1866 grant to the railroad.'5 5 The treaty, however, was not ratified by the
Senate and the Court could not, therefore, resolve the dispute on the basis of
prior recognized tribal title. Rather, the Court had to deal with the question
of whether Indian individuals acquired prior rights on the basis of enclosure,
residence, cultivation, and irrigation of a 170 acre tract from 1859 until the
153. D'ARcy McNICKLE, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM: INDIAN SURVIVALS AND RE-
NEWALS 78-79 (1973).
154. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
ANOMALY 211-12,226-34 (1994).According to Prucha:
There was no clear criterion-except, perhaps, expediency--for determining
what Indian political unit would be used for carrying on the negotiations. The
United States varied its decisions, sometimes treating with separate small divi-
sions of a "tribe," as in many treaties with Potawatornis and with Chippewas, and
at other times seeking to find (or designate) a single tribal chief to represent all
the bands together (even over the objections of the Indians, who declared that a
unitary chief was not their practice). In a good many instances tribes were
grouped together for a single treaty. Sometimes these were quite disparate or
even hostile groups, brought together to deal with some common issue; at other
times the negotiators might represent a dominant tribe with fragments of other
Indians traditionally attached to it. Treaty commissioners did not always know
ahead of time how many of the tribes and bands invited to a council would ac-
tually appear--or when. So they dealt with those at hand or extended the time
of signing to accommodate latecomers.
Id. at 212.
155. See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 609-10 (1982).
156. 261 U.S. 219 (1923), noted in United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39,50 n.14 (1985).
157. Cramer, 261 U.S. at 227.
158. Id. at 225.
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present action to cancel part of the defendant's patent.' 9 The Supreme
Court felt that this actual exclusive possession, even though not in accord
with the letter of the land disposition laws, was within "the policy of the
federal government ... to respect the Indian right of occupancy which [can]
only be interfered with or determined by the United States."' 60 This actual
occupation by Indian individuals allowed them to not only acquire posses-
sion of an amount of land greater than that available under the
homesteading acts, but also to prevail in all cases where the United States
had not clearly extinguished the Indian interests. 16'
Cramer was not really a theoretical keystone. It can be more properly
regarded as an offshoot of late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century United
States policies regarding the privatization of federal public land, and the as-
similation of the Indian peoples.'62
159. According to the Court:
The Act ofJuly 25, 1866, granted to the predecessor of the defendant company
a series of odd-numbered sections of land, including those named, but expected
from the grant such lands as "shall be found to have been granted, sold, reserved,
occupied by homestead settlers, pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of."
Id. at 225 (citations omitted).
160. The Court held:
It is true that this policy has had in view the original nomadic tribal occupancy,
but it is likewise true that in its essential spirit it applies to individual Indian oc-
cupancy as well; and the reasons for maintaining it in the latter case would seem
to be no less cogent, since such occupancy being of a fixed character lends sup-
port to another well understood policy, namely, that of inducing the Indian to
forsake his wandering habits and adopt those of civilized life. That such individ-
ual occupancy is entitled to protection finds strong support in various rulings of
the Interior Department to which in land matters this court has always given
much weight.
Id. at 227.
161. Id. at 222;see also United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339,347 (1941).
162. Id. at 227-29; see also John Ragsdale, The Movement to Assimilate the American Indians:
A Jurisprudential Study, 57 UMKC L. REv. 399, 406-07 (1989) [hereinafter Ragsdale]. In
CramerJustice Sutherland stated:
The action of these individual Indians in abandoning their nomadic habits
and attaching themselves to a definite locality, reclaiming, cultivating and im-
proving the soil and establishing fixed homes thereon was in harmony with the
well-understood desire of the government which we have mentioned. To hold
that by so doing they acquired no possessory rights to which the government
would accord protection, would be contrary to the whole spirit of the tradi-
tional American policy toward these dependent wards of the nation.
The fact that such right of occupancy finds no recognition in any statute or
other formal governmental action is not conclusive. The right, under the cir-
cumstances here disclosed, flows from a settled governmental policy.
Cramer, 261 U.S. at 228-29.
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The result in Cramer was due in part to a long tradition in public land
law that favored actual possession over constructive possession or possession
based on a legal technicality. The history of land and resource disposition in
the Western United States is replete with examples of assertive frontier indi-
viduals--settlers, grazers, loggers, irrigators, and miners-taking or using the
federal government's resources-land, timber, water, and minerals-outside
the parameters and letter of the law. The United States as owner of this land
not only silently and knowingly acquiesced in these trespasses, but retroac-
tively validated them with confirmatory law.'63 Cramer was also traceable to
the policy of assimilation which followed the Dawes Act of 1887164 and
which centered on the individual, non-tribal holding of land.161 Cramer re-
flects the policies of individualism and assimilation, if not the letter of
allotment or the focused efforts at tribal deconstruction.
There is a significant difference between the individual claims in
Cramer and Dann cases. Whereas Cramer dealt with exclusive, physical occu-
pation of 170 acres, the Dann case dealt with non-exclusive grazing over an
area thirty times as large. The question, then, is the significance of the differ-
ence between exclusive possession and usufructuary practices. The task for
resolution after remand fell first to the District Court.
The Nevada District Court, after remand from the Ninth Circuit, in
accord with the Supreme Court's decision, stated that Dewey Dann held an
individual aboriginal title to the exclusive occupancy of a section of land,
and a usufructuary interest, measured by the extent of use rather than area, in
grazing 170 head of cattle, plus calves, and ten head of horses, plus foals.
166
The Court further held that the subsequent actions of Mary and Carrie
Dann to accommodate grazing by 598 head of cattle, plus calves, and 840
head of horses, plus foals expanded the usufructuary rights.6 7 The district
court held that the aboriginal rights to graze, in contrast to the right of ex-
clusive possession, were held in common with other BLM permittees, but
were not to be subject to regulation.6
The Danns, on appeal, persisted in their dogged efforts to claim that
tribal aboriginal rights had survived private encroachment, the passage of the
general land management laws, the ICC, and even the Supreme Court.
169
Judge Canby, however, bound by precedent as a jurist, if not convinced sub-
stantively as an Indian law scholar, expressed resignation to the reality that
163. See GATES, supra note 65, at 219-47, 690-723; A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:6-9 (2003).
164. See JANET A. McDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887-
1934 1-5 (1991).
165. See Ragsdale, supra note 162, at 411-15.
166. Dann 111, 873 E2d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 1989).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1985).
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the tribal aboriginal rights claim was simply not viable. 7 ' Canby then turned
his attention to the issue of individual aboriginal rights.
Canby, advancing some scholarly dicta, wrote that there was no theo-
retical reason why individuals couldn't establish aboriginal rights in a
manner similar to tribes.17" ' They could show, for instance, that present indi-
viduals and their lineal ancestors had occupied land exclusively since time
immemorial and that Congress had never clearly extinguished this posses-
sory title.' 72 Canby's observation seems especially applicable to situations
such as that of the Western Shoshone in the Great Basin where the aborigi-
nal occupiers were more likely to be mobile, autonomous extended families,
rather than aggregated, hierarchically-organized political entities.17 1
The Danns, however, did not assert individual aboriginal rights from
time immemorial, or claim individual rights.'74 They continued with an as-
sertion that their individual use was an aspect of an overarching,
unextinguished tribal right. According to Judge Canby, this position was
now precluded by the Supreme Court's ruling that tribal title to aboriginal
lands and any remnant of tribal title that might inhere an individualized
user had been extinguished pursuant to the proceedings of the ICC. 7 5
There remained, however, the possibility of a limited form of individ-
ual aboriginal rights-not derivative from the tribe, not created by
unbroken, exclusive individual possession since time immemorial, and, ap-
parently, not even dependent on an affirmative claim by the Danns. The
Supreme Court had given a tentative endorsement for this concept with its
reference to the Cramer case, 17 and it became Judge Canby's task to verify
the doctrine and tailor it with respect to the Danns' particular situation.
Canby suggested that Cramer was reflective of the early-twentieth
century policies favoring land disposition and settlement in general, and
individualized Indian landholding, as an aspect of assimilation, in
170. Judge Canby wrote:
Now that the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Western Shoshone claim
has been paid, we cannot avoid the rule of Gemmill that payment for the taking of
a aboriginal tide establishes that that title has been extinguished. Even without
Gemmill, however, we would be directed by the negative implications of the Su-
preme Court's closing instructions in Dann.The Court remanded the question of
individual aboriginal tide in response to the Danns' argument "that because only
[tribal aboriginal rights] were before the Indian Claims Commission, the 'final
discharge' of 5 22(a) does not bar the Danns from raising individual aboriginal ti-
de as a defense in this action."
Dann II1, 873 F.2d 1189, at 1194-95.
171. Id. at 1195.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 59-63.
174. Dann III, 873 F2d 1189,1196 (9th Cir. 1989).
175. Id. at 1196.
176. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
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particular.' Both the assimilation policy and the land disposition patterns
that underlay Cramer ended in 1934 with the passage of the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) and the Taylor Grazing Act. 78 Thus, Canby
reasoned that Congress' silent acquiescence or implied consent to land
rights acquisition outside the letter of the law could no longer be
inferred.'7 9 Canby thus concluded that the district court had been wrong
to view the individual aboriginal rights as expanding with the Dann's
usage after 1934; rather, any individual aboriginal rights of occupation or
use were to be measured by acts preceding the TGA and the ensuing
closure of homesteading and the open range. 8 °
In short, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Dewey
Dann had acquired an individual aboriginal right to graze a certain number
of cattle and horses on land later incorporated into grazing districts man-
aged by the BLM. 8' This right of user is distinguishable from the right of
exclusive occupancy recognized in Cramer, but was deemed by the appellate
177. Dann II1, 873 E2d at 1197.
178. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 451 was designed to end
allotment, preserve and expand the tribal land base, rejuvenate tribal government, and
enable the tribes to interact economically with non-Indian society. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR,
THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 9-10 (S. Ill. Univ. Press 2002) (1992). The Taylor
Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315, was designed to stabilize the grazing industry, to enable the
protection and management of the public domain and to greatly curtail the disposition of
homestead lands. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 84, at 129-37.
179. Dann III, 873 E2d at 1198.
180. Judge Canby stated:
We conclude that the district court was correct in ruling that Dewey and
Sophie Dann could and did acquire individual aboriginal use rights to graze
cattle and horses on open range lands later incorporated into grazing districts.
Any such aboriginal right, however, must have been acquired prior to the
withdrawal of the lands from open grazing and their subjection to the regime
of the Taylor Grazing Act. The right also must have been continuously exer-
cised since that time.
The district court held that Dewey and Sophie Dann held an aboriginal
right to graze 170 head of cattle, plus calves, and 10 horses, plus foals, upon the
public domain. It also held that Mary and Carrie Dann had individual aborigi-
nal rights to graze 598 head of cattle, plus calves, and 840 head of horses, plus
foals, on public lands. Most of this livestock appears, however, to have been in-
troduced onto public lands well after the lands were subjected to the
administration of the Taylor Grazing Act. Dewey Dann's first application for a
grazing permit in 1935 sought permission to graze 21 cattle and 79 horses in
common with the livestock of other named ranches.To the extent that the dis-
trict court recognized aboriginal grazing rights for numbers and types of
animals beyond those grazed by the Danns at the time the lands were incorpo-
rated into grazing districts under the Taylor Grazing Act, it erred.
Id. at 1199-1200 (citations omitted).
181. Id.
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court to be in accord with the same policy observed in Cramer--that of
enabling individual Indians to pursue a domestic self-sufficient lifestyle and
economy. The right of the user was likewise deemed limited by the change
of policy in 1934 and the ending of allotment, homesteading, and the open
range. Thus, the additional cattle and horses introduced after that date by
Dewey, Mary, and Carrie Dann were not within the scope of the right and
were subject to the conditions of the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) as imple-
mented by the BLM. Not only were these excessive numbers subject to
federal regulation, the aboriginal right of user itself was deemed subject to
regulation by the BLM, under the logic of Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game,"'82 which had found that the State of Washington could regulate In-
dian tribes' treaty share of the salmon harvest with nondiscriminatory
conservation provisions.'83
II. CONTOURS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The Continuing Saga of the Dann Sisters
It might seem ironic that the Dann sisters, the driving force behind
the modern conception of individual aboriginal rights, want nothing to do
with the doctrine and have expressly disclaimed reliance on it in their on-
going confrontation with the Bureau of Land Management.Y14 The Danns
continue to proclaim the traditionalist rendition of events in the Great Ba-
sin: the extensive aboriginal range of the Western Shoshone, the
confirmation of possession in the Treaty of Ruby Valley, the limited conces-
sions made to the United States, the absence of any clear congressional
intent to extinguish and the illegitimate, collusive actions of the ICC, the
big-city lawyers, and the BLM. 185 The sisters refuse to accept the results
flowing from the Supreme Court's reliance on literal procedure and inertia,
and complete avoidance of the merits.
Non-Indians do not easily comprehended the Dann sisters uncom-
prising resolve, especially those living far from Crescent Valley and far
from the intimate contact that traditional tribalists have with their sacred
homelands.'86 The Danns reflect the deep bond that can exist between
182. 391 U.S. 391 (1968).
183. Dann II, 873 F2d at 1200.
184. See Dann Trespass, Questions and Answers, at http://www.nv.blm.gov/
danns/horseimpoundment/QsandAs.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
185. See Jeffrey Mullins, Dann Sisters Still Claim Right to Land, at http://
www.wysiwyg://8/http://www.angelfire.com/nv2/wells/danns.htm. (last visited Mar. 12,
2004).
186. Thomas Berry wrote: "The Indian now offers the Euroamerican a mystical sense
of the place of the human and other living beings. This is a difficult teaching for us since
we long ago lost our capacity for being present to the earth and its living forms in a mu-
tually enhancing manner." THomAS BERRv, THE DREAM OF THE EARTm 189-90 (1990).
SPRING 2004]
352 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 9:323
people and particular land. They have been infused with the fundamental,
enduring rhythm of their place and with the rhythm of countless genera-
tions of Shoshones who lived there, died there, were reborn, and marched
through the present into the future. They believe in their very depth that
such reciprocity cannot be shattered by the bloodless procedural render-
ings of an indifferent Supreme Court, sitting black-robed in a humid
eastern city more than 2000 miles away. They feel to their core that the
administrators, bureaucrats, judges, and legislators that would rupture the
traditional ties of others to this place offer nothing to the land-no love,
no feelings, no responsibility-that could replace the ancient links be-
tween a tribe and its sacred homeland. The sisters refuse to allow this
relationship to be broken by sterile procedure and shallow words, and
they refuse to accept what they regard as a pallid substitute in the form of
individual aboriginal rights. 18 7
Ancient patterns of internal culture set long before the events of the
last 140 years, explain part of the Danns' intolerance toward individual
rights. The Danns, as traditionalists, believe that individual rights in land
cannot transcend the rights of the tribe or the collective welfare of the
people.""8 In a related sense, they believe that the lands and rights of the
tribe are never for sale by or distributable to an individual.89
187. See infra notes 188-89.
188. Allison M. Dussias, Squaw Drudges, Farm Wives, and the Dann Sisters' Last Stand:
American Indian Women's Resistance to Domestication and the Denial of Their Property Rights, 77
N.C. L. REv. 637, 723 (1999); see also Kristin Chapin, Indian Fishing Rights Activists In An
Age of Controversy: The Case For an Individual Aboriginal Rights Defense, 23 ENVT'L. LAW 971,
976 (1993). Professor Dussias argues:
The Danns implicitly reject the idea, which was fundamental to the allot-
ment program, that land can be cut into pieces and parceled out to
individuals.The concept of individual land ownership is wholly incompatible
with their understanding of the land. The Danns' fundamental objection to
individual land ownership was manifested in their decision not to assert abo-
riginal title to a portion of the Western Shoshones' aboriginal lands as
individuals, despite the federal courts' recognition that such individual title
might exist. The Danns' Supreme Court brief explained that they have al-
ways considered the land they occupy to be the property of the Western
Shoshones as a whole.
Dussias, supra, at 723.
189. According to Dussias:
The Danns' rejection of the possibility of selling or dividing Western Sho-
shone land is intimately tied up with the role that the earth plays in their
world-view. For the Danns, the earth is most properly understood as their
mother. As Carrie Dann has put it, "[T]he earth is our mother.... Only a
woman can give birth, nourish life. We can't own the earth because we are
from the earth. Can you own your mother when she brought life to you?"
As mother, the earth can be depended upon to nurture her children: "Our
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Acknowledging the force, if not the logic or authority of legal
precedent the Danns have sought different venues for presentation of
their defense against the BLM and its efforts to stop their use of the land.
They have raised the issues of aboriginal tribal title before the Interior
Board of Land Appeals, as well as the issues of religious and cultural free-
dom. 9° The agency, following the lead of the Supreme Court, has
unequivocally rejected these claims as they relate to the issue of trespass.'91
The Danns have been extremely active in national and world opin-
ion and have explored a variety of avenues at home and abroad to present
the merits of their position and the failings of the United States. They
have made extensive use of the Internet, the national news media, and
have been featured in some widely circulated films by Joel Friedman.
92
They have emerged as national icons-tough, competent, unyielding
heroines who have raised families, horses, hackles, and hell with an in-
your-face, never-back-down vigor that has inspired some feminists, mi-
nority rights activists, anti-federalists, and environmentalists.9 3
human mother can only take care of us for so long, then as we get older we
must to our earth mother, who will take care of us for the rest of our lives."
The preservation of the earth mother is essential not only to the physical but
also the spiritual survival of the Danns; as Carrie Dann has explained: "If we
lose our land, we have lost our mother. We're spiritually dead. To us, it is to
be reduced down to nothingness."
Dussias, supra note 188, at 723-24. A split has emerged among the Western Shoshone re-
garding the selling of the land or, at least, regarding the receipt of the ICC cash award,
which has been steadily growing in trust. In spite of the mounting internal opposition, the
Danns remain firm. See Pauline Arrillaga, The Nation Sisters, Tribe at Odds Over Treaty West-
ern Shoshone Voted to Accept $137 Million From US. Government, But the Danns Refuse to
Cede Historical Territory, L.A.TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2003, at A24.
190. See Carrie & Mary Dann et al., IBLA 98-372 (1998), available at 1998
WL 1745355.
191. Id.
192. See CRUM, supra note 60, at 179; see also Charles Le Duff, Range War in Nevada
Pits US.Against 2 Shoshone Sisters, NYTIMEs, Oct. 31, 2002, at A18.
193. But see William Booth & Eric Pianin, Sisters Land Use Deplored, MiAMI HERALD,
Sept. 1, 2002, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/3979170.htm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2004).According to Booth and Pianin:
But seen another way, the Dann sisters are environmentally reckless, scoff-
laws who abuse public lands managed for all Americans by the Bureau of
Land Management.
The Dann sisters are now grazing about 1,500 head of cattle and horse
on public lands that the BLM says should permit no more than 180 animals.
The sisters say they've never paid a penny to the government to graze stock,
though their late father, and then his estate, did make payments. The BLM
says the Danns owe the government about $46,000 in grazing fees, and al-
most $3 million in fines for willfil trespass.
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In spite of international chastisement from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),'194 the unmollified, tight-lipped
officials from the BLM intensified their efforts to bring the Danns to
heel. 9 ' Not only did they continue to assert that the Danns were in viola-
tion of grazing permit requirements, and in arrears on grazing fees but,
beyond, they threatened to seize trespassing animals, sell them for pennies
on the dollar, and apply the funds toward the estimated three million dol-
Members of a citizen's advisory panel, which works with the BLM to as-
sess the health of the rangelands, recently visited the Dann ranch and wee
disgusted by the overgrazing.
"On a scale of one to 10, with 10 being the worst, that land looked like
an 11," saidVince Garcia, a Shoshone rancher and advisory board member.
"It was just dirt," said Helen Hankins, field manager for the BLM in Elko.
Id. But see Le Duff, supra note 192 ("Carrie Dann admitted her land was overgrazed, but
said she was not environmentally reckless. 'The rains will come again and the grass will
grow back,' she said. 'But when the Shoshone people are gone from this land, we are
dead. ").
194. See Mary & Carrie Dann v. United States, IACHR Report No. 75/02, Case
11.140 (Dec. 27, 2002), available at http://www.indianlaw.org/Dann_- PrRelease Final_
Report.pdf. The Indian Law Resource Center in Washington, D.C., said of the IACHR
report:
After an exhaustive review, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has affirmed that the United States has been violating international
human rights laws in its handling of the longtime land dispute between the
government and the Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada.
It is the first time that the United States has been formally found in vio-
lation of international human rights laws in its treatment of indigenous
peoples within its borders.
Id. Amnesty International, in commenting on the IACHR report, said:
Amnesty takes no side in disputes over land but the organization is deeply
concerned by IACHR's report that the human rights of the Western Sho-
shone are being violated by the United States. Amnesty is also concerned
about the alleged violation against them, in particular their rights to equality
before the law, to be free of discrimination, to fair trial and to property. The
way in which the United States has handled the land claim has been found
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to be in
violation of international law.
Amnesty International, Indigenous Rights Are Human Rights: Four Cases of Rights Vio-
lations in the Americas 31 (May 2003), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/justearth/
indigenous-people/indig-rights.report.html.
195. See Deborah Schaaf & Julie Fishel, Mary and Carrie Dunn v. United States at the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Victory For Indian Land Rights and the Environ-
ment, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 175, 186 (2002).
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lars in fees that the agency claimed was owed.'9 6 The public network of
support provided some help.Though it could not stop a federal agency on
an example-setting mission, it could, at least, assure that the Danns' stock
would not wind up in pet-food containers. Buyers interceded in sales and
auctions of the confiscated stock to purchase the animals, find new homes
for them, or hold them for return to the Danns.197 Perhaps the land and
the right to use it cannot, as yet, be secured to the Danns as tribalists, but
the collateral damage to the innocents can be minimized and the story,
with its passion and call for justice, can remain before the public.
Thus, the Danns soldier on with their indomitable spirit, in a war
with bureaucracy and in a race with time and advancing age. Their great
hope for a tribal renaissance and legal reunion with the beloved land de-
pends in large part on politics and the feelings and energy of strangers. It
could still happen. Lyda, Ida, and Helena Conley, Wyandotte Indian sisters
from Kansas City, Kansas, undertook responsibility for the protection of
196. See Le Duff, supra note 192; see also Lee Dazey, Western Shoshone Dunn Sisters
Face Imminent Threat to Livelihood, CITIZEN ALERT NEWSLETTER (Winter 2003), available at
http://www.citizenalert.org/newsltr/winter2003danns.html. According to Dazey:
Only days after release of the Organization ofAmerican State's (OAS) In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights final decision finding the U.S.
in violation of Western Shoshone rights to property, due process, and equal-
ity under the law, the Western Shoshone face forced federal seizure of
hundreds of horses owned by grandmothers Mary and Carrie Dann.
Despite the call by the OAS to remedy the situation, the United States
has stepped up its threats against them. In September, after the preliminary
decision has been released, the federal government came to the Dann area
with 40 armed agents, ATVs, rented cowboys, a helicopter and seized 227
head of cattle from Western Shoshone grandmothers Mary and Carrie Dann.
Later they said they were coming for the Western Shoshone horses.
Id.
197. As Dazey notes:
The wires have been buzzing among horse rescue organizations about the
ethics of purchasing the Dann horses. Several organizations came forward to
offer support. One organization led by a Missouri woman, Rainbow Farms,
nominated Carrie Dann for Oprah's, "Use Your Life Award."
In response to the imminent danger, a major effort is under way in Cres-
cent Valley to safely round up and evacuate the horses to a safe haven. The
Western Shoshone National Council (WSNC) announced on January 15th
the creation of the Western Shoshone International Goodwill Horse Pro-
gram to facilitate the horses passage to safety.
Dazy, supra note 196. Boone Tidwell from California returned three bulls to the Dann
sisters after he had bought them at a Bureau of Land Management auction. See Buyer Re-
turns Three Bulls to Dann Sisters, ELKO DAILY FREE PREss, Oct. 7, 2002, at Al.
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their sacred ancestral burial ground.19 They fought all the way to the
United States Supreme Court, lost, 99 and then fought some more-with
their bodies, shotguns, and unflinching resolve.2 00 They ultimately
won2 -and therefore so may the Danns. In the meantime, the abstraction
of individual aboriginal rights, though not complete, is not without sig-
nificance. The question remains: what is the scope and potential of the
concept?
B. Case Law Discussions of Individual Aboriginal Rights
While the Dann sisters continued to present their individual de-
fenses against federal trespass charges on the basis of tribal title, the tribe
itself, represented by the Western Shoshone National Council, began an
action in 1997 against the BLM and Oro Nevada Resources .12 The tribe
alleged harassment of tribal members, including the Danns, and invalid
approval of mining operations in the Crescent Valley area that threatened
traditional lands and sacred springs near the Dann ranch.20 3 Part of the
tribe's action to enjoin Oro and the BLM was premised on the individual
aboriginal rights of the tribal members.0 4 Though the complaints have
been dismissed without prejudice and the dismissal is on appeal, 20 the
tribe's second amended complaint and surreply present an expansive list-
ing of individual aboriginal usages that could be raised by individuals or
by a tribe seeking to assert and protect the rights of its members.2 6 In
198. See Kim Dayton, Trespassers, Beware, Lyda Burton Conely and the Battle for Huron
Place Cemetery, 8 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 1,26-28 (1996).
199. See Conley v. Ballinger, 216 U.S. 84, 90 (1910) (holding that treaty rights in the
cemetery were tribal and could not be invoked by an individual).
200. Dayton, supra note 198, at 19-26.
201. Id. at 26-28.
202. See Plaintiff's Complaint, W Shoshone Nat'l Council v. United States, No. S-
327-HDM (RHL), (D. Nev. 1997), available at www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/shoshone/
(last visited Apr. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Complaint].
203. Id. at 12-13; see also Second Amended Complaint, W Shoshone Nat'l Council
v. United States, No. S-327-HDM (RHL), (D. Nev. 1997), available at www.nativeweb.org/
pages/legal/shoshone/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
204. Id.at 18-21.
205. See Western Shoshone Land and Sovereignty Official Website, at http://
www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/shoshone (providing a chronology of the court actions in
W Shoshone Nat'l Council v. United States, No. S-327-HDM (RHL), (D. Nev. 1997), avail-
able at www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/shoshone/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
206. Plaintiff's Surreply, W Shoshone Nat'l Council v. United States, No. S-327-
HDM (RHL), (D. Nev. 1997), available at www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/shoshone/ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2004). The Surreply states:
The controlling cases have thus never restricted individual aboriginal
rights to the terms of a quiet title action, which would require and be lir-
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ited to articulation of specific land title claims.The cases cited in this Court's
Order of September 10, 1998, allowing Plaintiff's to amend their Complaint
to state individual rights with more particularity, are in accord with this
principle.
By way of example, and to put the matter in context, the uses and occu-
pations listed in Plaintiffs' Complaint could be expanded as follows to show
what is meant by "Indian purposes," as these continue to be exercised, from
time immemorial to the present:
Hunting: the right to hunt the following species, but not limited to these
species:
Jackrabbits, all forms of squirrels, rock chucks, coots, chuckawallas, black
birds, crows, porcupines, etc. in keeping with Western Shoshone law, the
only factor for consideration is that they are available to hunt and not to
hunt the species into extinction, but always to leave an abundant amount
to keep the species for future generations.
Fishing: The right to fish for the following, including but not limited
to: carp, minnows, crawdads, white fish, shiners, chubs, etc.
Foods: The right to gather traditional foods, including but not limited
to the following: pine nuts, yomba, wild onions, wild garlic, sego, choke
cherries, elder berries, buck berries, wild currants, rule roots, hawthorn
berries,juniper berries, rose bush berries, service berries, and all forms of
wild grass seeds, etc.
Herbs and medicines: The right to gather all forms of herbs and me-
dicinal plants and roots, including but not limited to: doza, pah-de-via,
aanda-vich-quanah, greasewood, Indian tea, pine pitch, sagebrush, lesser
sage, willows, etc.
Religion and Sacred Rights: The right to assembly and perform sacred
and religious rites on Western Shoshone territory, including but not lim-
ited to the following: to visit, bathe, and pray at all hot springs; to pray
and prepare on all high places; to get avi-vee, bishop, lesser sage, juniper,
rabbit brush; to visit and hold religious ceremonies at Western Shoshone
burials throughout the territory, etc.
Crafts:The right to gather all forms of material for crafts, including but
not limited to the following: willows, tules, pine pitch, red willows,jack-
rabbit fur, rocks for grinding, sagebrush bark, buck brush bark, juniper
bark, white chert, porcupine quills, etc.
Wood for Burning: The right to gather all forms of dead wood, includ-
ing but not limited to dead juniper, dead pine, dead mahogany, dead
sagebrush, dead rabbit brush, dead buck brush, dead aspen.
Water: the right to use water, including rainwater, for religious rites,
cleansing, drinking to sustain life, and for any other purpose.
Air:The right to breathe air to keep one's self alive.
Sun: The right to be in the rays of the sun for warmth and other pur-
poses.
Space:The right to occupy space for one's body.
Customs: The right to engage in commerce with foreign nations and
sharing all resources with otherWestern Shoshone is good and bad years.
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general, these potential usages are of a non-exclusive, usufructuary nature
that would permit proponents to avoid the difficulties of proceeding un-
der the Federal Quiet Title Act. 20 7
The case law emergent between Dann IIP°8 and the current Western
Shoshone conflict does not seem to bode well for the expanded applica-
tion of individual aboriginal rights. However, the general lack of depth in
the discussions should not preclude reconsideration of the issue, especially
if the future actions are combined with certain parallel theories, which
will be discussed shortly.
1. Hunting and Fishing Rights
If an individual seeks to assert usufructuary hunting or fishing rights
as a member of a tribe, the initial question is whether or not a treaty or
unextinguished tribal aboriginal rights would include such individual ex-
ercise. Hunting and fishing rights have been held to be aspects of a
tribe's aboriginal possession, or a part of its treaty rights, even when not
expressly mentioned."' If a treaty of cession or a statutory extinguishment
207. The Western Shoshone proceeded on the theory that an action to assert abo-
riginal use rights or usufruct in federal land does not constitute an action to quiet title to
real property, which must proceed under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a). The
tribe might also have asserted that the Quiet Title Act does not apply to Indian interest
held in trust by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a); see also Devils Lake Sioux Tribe
v. North Dakota, 714 F Supp. 1019, 1020 (D.N.D. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 917 F2d
1049 (8th Cir. 1990). It has been held that aboriginal titles are, because of the operation of
25 U.S.C. § 177, held in a limited trust by the United States. See Joint Tribal Council of
the Pasamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F2d 370,379 (1st Cir. 1975).
208. See 873 F2d 1189,1193 (9th Cir. 1989).
209. See generally STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 214-38 (3d
ed. 2002).
210. See United States v.Winans, 198 U.S. 371,381 (1905).According to the Court:
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part of larger
rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a
shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the exis-
tence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. New conditions
came into existence, to which those rights had to be accommodated. Only a
limitation of them, however, was necessary and intended, not a taking away.
In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant
of rights from them--a reservation of those not granted.
Id. at 381; see also Whiterock v. Nevada, 918 P.2d 1309 (Nev. 1996), where the Court
stated:
Native Americans who occupied the land in this country before the arrival
of European settlers acquired legal rights to the land under a theory of abo-
riginal tide. Aboriginal tide is tantamount to fee simple except that it does
not grant tribes or individual Indians the power to transfer tide. Aboriginal
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is clear enough, however, then not only may tribal title pass, but the rights
of individual usufruct may as well. 21 A similar result may occur under the
effect of an ICC judgment and award. In Western Shoshone National Coun-
cil v. Molini,212 the tribe argued that aboriginal hunting and fishing rights,
and similar rights under the Treaty of Ruby Valley had survived the ICC
judgment and were assertable against the State of Nevada.2 13 The Ninth
Circuit, however, felt that the ICC award conclusively established the ex-
tinguishment of the Western Shoshone title both possessory and
usufructuary, and precluded further assertion, in both federal and state
cases. 214
Victor Whitlock, a Western Shoshone accused of hunting without a
license in the aftermath of the Molini decision, made direct use of the
individual aboriginal rights defense 2 t'-and the Nevada Supreme Court
made short work of it. The court first reiterated the Molini position that
Whiterock and other tribal members can no longer claim the ability to
exercise tribal aboriginal rights to hunt and fish, because these were
subsumed in the ICC judgment.2 6 Then, relying in part on the Molini
conclusion that there was no tribal right of hunting and fishing and in
part on the principle that states traditionally have been accorded the
power to regulate those usufructs, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned
that there was no basis in federal common law for the individual
aboriginal rights defense. 21 7 The court distinguished Dann III and its
individual right of occupation and grazing on the basis that it stemmed
from federal policies of settlement, whereas, the federal policy with
respect to wildlife, has been to defer to the state." 8
title basically guarantees the right to occupy the land and exercise the atten-
dant rights of hunting, fishing, and gathering on the land.
Id. at 1310 (citations omitted); see also Chapin, supra note 188, at 975.
211. Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 756
(1985). But see Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 56 U.S. 172, 200-02
(1999).
212. 951 E2d 200 (9th Cir. 1991).
213. Id. at 201-02.
214. ChiefJudge Wallace stated:
The Shoshone argue that Oregon Dept. of Fish should be limited to cases in-
volving treaties, and does not have any relevance to our interpretation of the
Commission's findings. But how can this be so? Both cases involve a general
transfer of tide. This unqualified transfer of title includes a transfer of hunting
and fishing rights.
Id. at 203 (citations omitted).
215. 4hiterock, 918 P.2d at 1310.
216. Id. at 1311.
217. Id. at 1313.
218. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, declared:
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It is arguable that the Nevada Court was wrong to assume that
individual aboriginal rights stem from, and are limited by, an association
with United States policy. In Dann III, Canby observed that individual
rights in grazing might accord with federal policy observed in Cramer, but
that these rights arose from long-standing usage that preceded specific
congressional withdrawal. 219 If rights are created by aboriginal usage and
constrained by overarching federal policy, then individual aboriginal rights
in hunting and fishing could arise through intergenerational usage and
custom, thus leaving the question of whether a policy to defer to the states
on hunting regulation was an express extinguishment of those rights. The
Supreme Court's recent holding in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians2 ° makes this proposition questionable.
2 21
In view of the long-standing federal policy of allowing states to regulate
wildlife within their borders, and in light of the absence of tribal rights to
hunt and fish, we conclude that there is no basis in federal law which would
grant Whiterock an individual aboriginal right to hunt in the Humboldt Na-
tional Forest free from regulation by the State of Nevada. Dann is
distinguishable on the ground that it involved grazing rights, which were
based on federal policies. In contrast, the federal policy with respect to wild-
life is to defer to the state-there is no overriding federal policy.
Even if Whiterock were able to establish that he or his ancestors had
continuously hunted in the forest for their subsistence since 1906 (the date
that President Theodore Roosevelt reserved the land which became the
Humboldt National Forest from settlement), there is no federal policy which
would mandate recognition of special rights for individual tribal members in
the absence of any such tribal rights. The State's interest in preserving and
regulating the wildlife within its boundaries is therefore the overriding valid
interest. Whiterock has a right to hunt in Nevada, but he must comply with
the reasonable non-discriminatory regulations of the State.
Id. at 1313.
219. See Dann III, 873 E2d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The rule of Cramer is not
inconsistent with recognition of a grazing right in individual Indians, acquired prior to
subjection of the lands in question to the regime of the Tailor Grazing Act.").
220. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
221. Justice O'Connor stated for the majority:
As this Court's subsequent cases have made clear, an Indian tribe's treaty
rights to hunt, fish, and gather on state land are not irreconcilable with a
State's sovereignty over the natural resources in the State. Rather, Indian
treaty rights can coexist with state management of natural resources. Al-
though States have important interests in regulating wildlife and natural
resources within their borders, this authority is shared with the Federal Gov-
ernment when the Federal Government exercises one of its enumerated
constitutional powers, such as treaty making. Here, the 1837 Treaty gave the
Chippewa the right to hunt, fish, and gather in the ceded territory free of
territorial, and later state, regulation, a privilege that others did not enjoy. To-
day, this freedom from state regulation curtails the State's ability to regulate
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2. Possessory Rights
Dann III, as noted, found two types of individual aboriginal rights-
those in exclusive possession, and those in nonexclusive usufruct, which
are held in common and subject to regulation.222 Both types are depend-
ent on establishment before the United States Congress makes a
withdrawal such as that affected by the Taylor Grazing Act and its limita-
tions on homesteading and free, open range grazing. 23 Even if aboriginal
title is established prior to a withdrawal, a reservation, beyond a with-
drawal, to a specific federal purpose such as a national park or forest, may
be deemed to extinguish the aboriginal title without the constitutional
necessity of compensation.122
In United States v. Kent,22 a defendant in a trespass case asserted that
individual aboriginal rights warranted her residential occupation of land
in a national forest. The Ninth Circuit, led by Canby, dismissed the avail-
ability of a Dann III defense. 26 Even though Kent had ancestral ties to the
particular site, she herself had not undertaken possession until 1984, long
after the land had been included in a national forest and closed to public
entry and settlement. 227
hunting, fishing, and gathering by the Chippewa in the ceded lands. But this
Court's cases have also recognized that Indian treaty-based usufructuary
rights do not guarantee the Indians "absolute freedom" from state regulation.
We have repeatedly reaffirmed state authority to impose reasonable and nec-
essary nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights in the interest of conservation. This "conservation necessity"
standard accommodates both the State's interest in management of its natural
resources and the Chippewa's federally guaranteed treaty rights. Thus, be-
cause treaty rights are reconcilable with state sovereignty over natural
resources, statehood by itself is insufficient to extinguish Indian treaty rights
to hunt, fish, and gather on land within state boundaries.
Id. at 204-05 (citations omitted).
222. Dann III, 873 E3d at 1200.
223. Id.
224. See Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 E Supp. 1471, 1478 (D. Ariz. 1990); see
also United States v. Gemmill, 535 F2d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pueblo
of San Ildefonso, 513 F2d 1383, 1386, 1391-92 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
225. 945 F2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1991).
226. Id. at 1444.
227. Id. Judge Canby focused on the defendant's failure to establish individual abo-
riginal rights before the land withdrawal and did not assert the possibility that the
reservation of the land as a national forest would operate to extinguish aboriginal title.
Kent's claim fails to meet the requirements established in Dann. She began
her occupancy of this parcel of land in 1984, long after her tribe's title to the
land had been extinguished, and long after the land had been established as a
National Forest, closed to public entry and settlement. No lineal ancestors
immediately preceded her in occupancy.We are acutely aware of, and respect,
the strong attachment that Kent has by virtue of family, culture, and tradition
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Pai Ohana brought a quiet title action against the United States and
used an argument similar to the arguments used in Kent: actual possession
and residence of ancestral lands lying within Hawaii's KaloKo-
Honokohau National Historical Park. 221 Unlike Kent, the Pai family had
resided on and utilized the land for generations. When the park was cre-
ated in 1988, ten families, including the Pai, were in occupation. The
United States, seeking to clear title, offered the residents a choice of relo-
cation benefits up to $5000 per household or special use permits allowing
them to remain on the property for a term of five years and renewable by
agreement. 229 The Pal family held a special use permit, but failed to renew
it on expiration. In late 1992, some of the Pai family attempted to deny
access to park personnel and to visitors. In 1994, park efforts to compel
the Pai to clean up abandoned property were treated as a threat of evic-
tion 3.23  The Pai family filed suit in 1994 under the Quiet Title Act,231
claiming the right to exclusively occupy and use a five acre tract, and as-
serting in part an individual aboriginal title.
2 32
The federal district court held that the family did not have a right to
exclusive use or occupancy, either under patent, Hawaiian law, or the fed-
eral doctrine of individual aboriginal title. With regard to the latter, the
court felt that the Pai family had never held the land exclusively, which
the court viewed as part of the Cramer-Dann III test for an individual abo-
riginal right of title.233 The court also stated that although the Pai family
had undertaken a non-exclusive possession before the establishment of
to this parcel of land on Sandy Bar Creek. Cramer, however, permits us to
protect such ties in the form of legal title only for those Indians who have
maintained a presence on that land. We cannot, under Cramer and Dann, find
such title in all Indians who attempt to return to their ancestral lands.
Id.
228. Pai Ohana v. United States, 875 F Supp. 680 (D. Haw. 1995). The word 'ohana'
means family in Hawaiian. Id. at 682 n.1.
229. Id. at 683.
230. Id. at 684.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2000).
232. Pai Ohana, 875 F Supp. at 695.
233. Judge Ezra declared:
The essential elements of individual aboriginal title are established if an
Indian can show: "[1] that she or her lineal ancestors continuously occupied
a parcel of land, as individuals, and [2] that the period of continuous
occupancy commenced before the land was withdrawn for purposes of
settlement." The Ninth Circuit stated that to establish individual aboriginal
title, one must show actual possession by occupancy, enclosure, or other
actions, to the exclusion of all others and that the aboriginal title had never
been extinguished.
Id. at 697 (citations omitted).
[VOL. 9:323
Individual Aboriginal Rights
the national historical park, the establishment of the park by Congress,
accompanied by compensatory options and disclaimers, clearly and effec-
tively extinguished any aboriginal title the Pai family may have had.23 1
The district court's apparent suggestion that a non-exclusive right
might have been established is significant. It means that the Pai Ohana
case, implicitly, and the Dann III case, explicitly, have found that non-
exclusive aboriginal usage, though not a basis for an exclusive right or
title, may still be a basis for a lesser, non-exclusive-but still protected-
interest.This may be of importance in the sacred site access cases.
3. Sacred Sites and Customs
A significant aspect of individual aboriginal rights, noted in the
Western Shoshone surreply,23s is access to and use of off-reservation sacred
sites. Such rights involve easements rather than exclusive occupation.
Recognition and protection of such interests are highly important in the
protection of tribal culture from the substantial impacts of off-reservation
transformative activities.236 Despite the results and reasoning in Dann III,
the direct consideration of the issue has not been particularly encourag-
ing.
The Havasupai Tribe and individual members sought a declaratory
judgment and an injunction against the United States Forest Service ap-
proval of a uranium mining operation in the Kaibab National Forest, near
the Grand Canyon National Park.237 The tribe and individual members
alleged that the site of the proposed mine was sacred to the tribe, whose
reservation lies thirty-five miles away. The mine development threatened
access to the site and destruction of "the very essence of their religious
and cultural system."2 38 At oral argument the plaintiffs asserted the tribal
234. Id. at 698. The assertion of non-exclusive practices of subsistence, culture, or
religion may have fared better due to Hawaii's unique constitutional provision, which
obligates the state to preserve and enforce such rights. See HAw. CoNsT. art. XII 5 7
(amended 1985(c)); see also M. Casey Jarman Robert & R. M.Verchick, Beyond the Courts
of the Conqueror: Balancing Private and Cultural Property Rights Under Hawaii Law, 5 SCHOLAR
201,206-07 (2003).
235. See supra note 206.
236. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-54
(1988) (curtailing the use of the Free Exercise Clause and the doctrine of strict judicial
scrutiny which calls for a government showing of a compelling state interest and an ab-
sence of less restrictive alternative in the sacred sites cases).
237. Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 E Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990).
238. Id. at 1476.The case relied on Lyng, for the rejection of strict scrutiny under the
First Amendment:
Plaintiffs here, as in Lyng, assert that their religious and cultural belief systems
are intimately bound up with the Canyon Mine site. Plaintiffi assert their be-
lief that EFN's operations will destroy their religion. The Supreme Court, in
Lyng, made the same assumption in reaching its conclusion of no First
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members' individual aboriginal rights of access to the site for religious and
cultural purposes. 23 The district court rejected the contention in part on
its misperception that a protectable individual aboriginal right requires a
showing of exclusive possession.2 4 In fact, usufructuary individual abo-
riginal rights can be based on non-exclusive uses and can be held in
common with the rights of others, under the Dann III test.24' The Ninth
Circuit affirmed based on a different rationale 4.2 2 The court found instead
that the ICC judgment for the taking of the land in 1880, and the ensu-
ing congressional payment, extinguished all aboriginal title in the area.2 3
The terse per curiam opinion seems to recognize the distinction between
Amendment violation. Accordingly, the court finds and concludes that no
First Amendment violation is present in this case.
Id. at 1485.
239. Id. at 1479.
240. Judge Strand further stated that:
An Indian cannot gain a right of occupancy simply by occupying public
lands. Id. Even accepting the religious significance and use of the site by the
individual Indians (as set forth in the Record and the Offer of Proof), the
court finds that this does not amount to actual possession of the Canyon
Mine site to the exclusion of all others.
Id. at 1480.
241. See Dann III, 873 E2d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 1989).
242. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991). According to the
Court:
The Tribe also claims a right of access, essentially amounting to an ease-
ment, to the area that includes the mine site. This claim is based on an
argument that until the 1970s, when the Grand Canyon National Park
Enlargement Act was passed, the Tribe retained aboriginal title to that land.
The GCEA includes a provision that states that it is not to be construed as
depriving the Tribe of access to its religious sites. Since the GCEA is what
extinguished aboriginal title, the Tribe claims, this provision works as a con-
dition upon the Tribe's relinquishment, and pursuant to it the Tribe retained
part of the "bundle of rights"-namely, an easement to any religious site in-
cluded within the land it gave up.
If the GCEA were the legislative action through which the Havasupais'
aboriginal title to the area was extinguished, the Tribe's argument on this is-
sue would have significant merit. Such, however, is not the case. In 1969, the
Indian Claims Commission ordered Congress to pay, and Congress did pay,
compensation to the Havasupai for this land, based on the Commission's
finding that Congress had taken the land in 1880. This finding, in turn, was
made after a hearing in which the Havasupai presented evidence that such a
taking had occurred at that time. Once Congress compensated the Tribe,
aboriginal title was extinguished.
Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
243. Id.
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an aboriginal right of exclusive possession and one amounting to an
easement of access. 244 The opinion can also be read as disposing only of
tribal aboriginal rights, and ignoring those of individuals. 241
The Dann sisters again raised the religious and cultural access issue
before the Interior Board of Land Appeals in 1998,246 but their claims
were dismissed without any real discussion.247 Therefore, the issue remains:
can an individual aboriginal right for non-exclusive usage, usufructuary or
spiritual, be established outside the formal legal mechanisms and receive
judicial protection from subsequent, non-congressional interference?
Dann III clearly says yes, but the subsequent case law, with its confusion
between possessory and non-exclusive usage and between tribal and indi-
vidual interests, has made the waters murky. However, there are some
additional doctrines related to individual aboriginal rights that may
strengthen and clarify the concept.
III. SOME ASSOCIATED CONCEPTS
A. Custom
Customary law, as a basis for individual and collective rights in pri-
vate lands, has some foundation in American jurisprudence, despite the
relative newness of American society. State ex rel Thornton v. Hay248 estab-
lished, as a matter of state common law, the customary right of public
access along the privately owned dry sand beaches of Oregon.249 The
Oregon Supreme Court's definition of legally protectable custom parallels
244. Id. ("The tribe also claims a right of access, essentially amounted to an easement
.... .).
245. Id. (All references are to tribal claims of right).
246. See Carrie & Mary Dann et al., IBLA 98-372 (1998), available at 1998 WL
1745355.
247. The Board stated:
The Danns have once again raised these same issues on appeal. We find they
have been finally determined by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Dann, supra. Moreover, under 43 C.ER. § 2910.1-2(a), any use, occupancy or
development of the public lands, other than casual use, without authoriza-
tion, shall be considered a trespass. "Casual use" includes only short-term
noncommercial activity. 43 C.FR. § 2920.0-5(k). Where the record shows
that unauthorized use included long-term grazing and the erection of build-
ings, it was not casual use. Even though the parties may have used the land
under the belief that this was Western Shoshone land and not public land,
their good faith is irrelevant to liability for trespass, but may be considered
only as to whether the trespass was intentional.
Id.
248. 462 P2d 671 (Or. 1969).
249. Id. at 673-74.
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the definitions of individual aboriginal rights. The court said that the req-
uisites of custom included ancient usage that was uninterrupted,
peaceable, reasonable, certain, and not inconsistent with other customs or
laws.250 The court felt that this definition was met with respect to the pub-
lic usage of the dry sand. The court stated that the ancient use
requirement, seemingly problematic in an area populated by European
immigrants for just over a century, was met because the Indian peoples
had used the dry sand since long before the White arrival. s1 It is perhaps
250. The Court stated:
Paraphrasing Blackstone, the first requirement of a custom, to be recog-
nized as law, is that it must be ancient. It must have been used so long "that
the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." Professor Cooley foot-
notes his edition of Blackstone with the comment that "long and general"
usage is sufficient. In any event, the record in the case at bar satisfies the re-
quirement of antiquity. So long as there has been an institutionalized system
of land tenure in Oregon, the public has freely exercised the right to use the
dry-sand area up and down the Oregon coast for the recreational purposes
noted earlier in this opinion.
The second requirement is that the right be exercised without interrup-
tion. A customary right need not be exercised continuously, but it must be
exercised without an interruption caused by anyone possessing a paramount
right....
Blackstone's third requirement[s] that the customary use be peaceable and
free from dispute ....
The fourth requirement, that of reasonableness, is satisfied by the evi-
dence that the public has always made use of the land in a manner
appropriate to the land and to the usages of the community....
The fifth requirement, certainty, is satisfied by the visible boundaries of
the dry-sand area and by the character of the land, which limits the use
thereof to recreational uses connected with the foreshore.
The sixth requirement is that a custom must be obligatory; that is, in the
case at bar, not left to the option of each landowner whether or not he will
recognize the public's right to go upon the dry-sand area for recreational
purposes....
Finally, a custom must not be repugnant, or inconsistent, with other cus-
toms or with other law. The custom under consideration violates no law, and
is not repugnant.
Id. at 677.
251. Judge Goodwin, speaking for the majority, said:
On the score of the brevity of our political history, it is true that the Anglo-
American legal system on this continent is relatively new. Its newness has
made it possible for government to provide for many of our institutions by
written law rather than by customary law. This truism does not, however,
militate against the validity of a custom when the custom does in fact exist.
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ironic that aboriginal usage thus serves as a basis for the customary rights
of non-Indians.
The federal common law has been held to include some customary
individual rights of access as well. The Supreme Court has hnked these
rights to the general principle of free access to the public domain,2 2 but
they extend to passage across adjacent and interlocked private lands to the
extent that such lands are not enclosed by fencing. 23 The more recent
case of Leo Sheep Company v. United States"4 decided that the federal gov-
ernment itself, in contrast to private citizens, did not, as grantor, retain an
express or implied easement of passage across the private lands of its
grantees.25 The Court was careful, however, to distinguish, and thus pre-
serve, the rule of customary private access set forth in Buford v. Houtz. 2s6
If antiquity were the sole test of validity of a custom, Oregonians could sat-
isfy that requirement by recalling that the European settlers were not the first
people to use the dry-sand area as public land.
Id. at 677-78.
252. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320,326 (1890).
253. Justice Miller, writing for a unanimous Court, declared:
[T]he instances became numerous in which persons purchasing land from
the United States put only a small part of it in cultivation, and permitted the
balance to remain unenclosed, and in no way separated from the lands
owned by the United States. All the neighbors who had settled near one of
these prairies or on it, and all the people who had cattle that they wished to
graze upon the public lands, permitted them to run at large over the whole
region, fattening upon the public lands of the United States and upon the
unenclosed lands of the private individual without let or hindrance. The
owner of a piece of land, who had built a house or enclosed 20 or 40 acres
of it, had the benefit of this universal custom, as well as the party who owned
no land. Everybody used the open unenclosed country, which produced nu-
tritious grasses, as a public common on which their horses, cattle, hogs and
sheep could run and graze.
Id. at 327-28.
254. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
255. Id. at 678-82.
256. Justice Rehnquist preserved the essence of Buford by noting:
The appellants there were a group of cattle ranchers seeking, inter alia, an in-
junction against sheep ranchers who moved their herds across odd-
numbered lots held by the appellants in order to graze their sheep on even-
numbered public lots. This Court denied the requested relief because it was
contrary to a century-old grazing custom. The Court also was influenced by
the sheep ranchers' lack of any alternative.
"Upon the whole, we see no equity in the relief sought by the appellants in
this case, which undertakes to deprive the defendants of this recognized right
to permit their cattle to run at large over the lands of the United States and
feed upon the grasses found in them, while under pretence of owning a small
proportion of the land which is the subject of controversy, they themselves ob-
tain the monopoly of this valuable privilege."
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The alliance between individual aboriginal rights and custom was
attempted in Pai Ohana v. United States,257 without marked success. The
failure stemmed in part from the plaintiff's effort to establish an exclusive
right based on custom and the concept of individual aboriginal rights,
rather than a more limited and non-exclusive servitude." 8 The Ninth Cir-
cuit felt that the plaintiff had failed to prove that custom included "the
right to remain upon and exclude others from the land.' 2 9 Still, the con-
cept of custom may have vitality if employed in the more limited context
of usufructuary or non-exclusive use.
B. Prescription
While customary usage by aboriginal people, originating in the past
and continuing into the present, may induce a generous court to discern a
non-exclusive public servitude on private fee patents, a more accepted,
but decidedly more limited approach exists. Even a court not inclined or
called upon to find aboriginal rights or customary rights may find con-
temporary usage of an open, notorious, and continuous nature, sufficient
to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. After a set time, this
can result in a prescriptive easement to be held by the particular individu-
als or class of individuals making the use.
2
60
A recent example of a presumptive easement for a pilgrimage of
aboriginal origin involved the Zuni Indians of western New Mexico and
a mountain called Kohlu/wala:wa, located fifty miles to the west of their
reservation in Arizona. Kohlu/wala:wa is a sacred mountain to the Zuni;
it is considered to be the place of origin and the home of the dead.
26
'
Since time immemorial, Zuni pilgrims have made a quadrennial journey,
at the time of the summer solstice, along a prescribed route from the Zuni
Pueblo to the summit. The pilgrimage, approximately 110 miles in length,
Here neither custom nor necessity supports the Government.
Id. at 688 n. 24 (citations omitted). The fact that such servitudes can be discerned on fed-
eral grants to private parties adds force to the argument that land disposal by
administrators does not amount to the extinguishment of tribal or individual aboriginal
rights. See U. S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339,347 (1941).
257. 76 F3d 280 (9th C.ir 1995).
258. Id. at 282.
259. Id. Under the Hawaii Constitution, custom might be employed to protect non-
exclusive rights of subsistence, culture, and religion. See Pai Ohana v. United States, 875 F
Supp. 680, 697; see also Ka Pa'akal 0 Ka'ina v. Land Use Comm'n, State of Hawaii, 7 R3d
1068, 1082 (Haw. 2000).
260. Courts are generally unwilling to find that prescriptive easements are held by
the general public unless a governmental body facilitated the adverse user. See State ex rel.
Meek v. Hays, 785 P2d 1356, 1363 (Kan. 1990).
261. United States v. Platt, 730 E Supp. 318, 319 (D. Ariz. 1990).
[VOL. 9:323
Individual Aboriginal Rights
crosses public and private land in an area taken by the United States in
the nineteenth century, and subsequently checker-boarded by railroad and
homestead grants.2 62 In 1985, Earl Platt, an intervening land owner hostile
to the Zunis and their passage, sought to bar the Zunis from crossing his
land.2 63 In 1985, the United States filed suit on behalf of the Zuni claim-
ing a prescriptive easement across Platt's land.2 64 The Zuni intervened in
1988 and asserted a free exercise of religion rights claim under interna-
tional law and the U.S. Constitution.2 65
The hardest issues for the Zuni prescription were the requirements
under Arizona state law of openness and continuity of possession. 266 The
court found that the Zuni usage was "open, visible, and known to the
community,"2 67 even though there was evidence that Platt, who owned or
controlled about 400,000 acres did not, in fact, know of the pilgrimage
during much of the asserted running of the statute of limitations.26 The
court also found that the quadrennial pilgrimage was continuous, in the
sense that the Indians had actual possession of the route they used on a
regular basis, even though that possession was for but a short time every
four years. The regularity, the uncompromising nature, and the aboriginal
origins convinced the court that this was actual and continuous use of a
limited easement. 269
262. Public Law 98-408 allowed the Zunis to acquire over 11,000 acres surrounding
Kohlu/wala:wa and place it in trust status. See E. Richard Hart, Protection of Kohlu/wala:wa
(Zuni Heaven): Litigation and Legislation, in ZUNI AND THE COURTS 199, 202 (E. Richard
Hart ed., 1995). The Zuni did not attempt to purchase land along the entire route from
the reservation to the summit. See Platt, 730 F Supp. at 319 n.I.
263. See Hank Meshorer, The Sacred Trail to Zuni Heaven: A Study in the Law of Pre-
scriptive Easements, in ZUNI AND THE COURTS, 208,210 (E. Richard Hart ed., 1990).
264. Platt, 730 F Supp. at 319.
265. The international and federal constitutional issues were severed from the issues
of prescriptions. Id.
266. Id. at 322.
267. Id. at 321.
268. Platt apparently missed the opportunity to contest actual knowledge and chose
to focus on less forceful or effective legal arguments. MESHORER, supra note 263, at 216-17.
269. Judge Carroll declared:
The Zuni tribe has had actual possession of the route used for the religious
pilgrimage for a short period of time every four years. They have had actual
possession of the land in the sense that they have not recognized any other
claim to the land at the time of the pilgrimage, as evidenced by their lack of
deviation from the established route and disregard for fences or any other
man made obstacle that blocks their course of travel. This Court also finds
that the Zuni Tribe continually used a portion of the defendant's land for a
short period of time every four years at least since 1924 and very probably
for a period of time spanning many hundreds of years prior to that year.
Therefore, the plaintiffs have established the "actual" and "continuous"
possession elements of their claim for adverse possession. Furthermore, this
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The extent of the prescriptive interest acquired was in precise ac-
cord with the dictates and necessities of the religious practice. It afforded
a limited group of Zunis a non-exclusive right of passage along the tradi-
tional route for two days every four years. There was a slight modification
from the undeviating aboriginal practice in that the Zuni were required
to use existing gates and refrain from cutting the fences, and would be
liable for damages to Platt's property.27
In sum, the Zuni case presents the possibility that an aboriginal us-
age requiring the crossing of non-Indian lands may support a claim under
state law for prescriptive easement-without necessary recourse to either
the Free Exercise Clause2" ' or the particularized requirements of individ-
ual or tribal aboriginal rights. Prescription or adverse possession under
state law will not however control the effect of long-standing usage of
federal lands. The acquisition of personal rights of use or passage on BLM
or national forest lands demands accordance with the common law of
individual aboriginal rights or compliance with the federal land manage-
ment statutes.27 2 One slim possibility in this regard is that Indian tribes or
individuals may arguably have acquired, prior to 1976, vested rights of
"actual" possession has been continuous for over ten years which is required
for a claim of a prescriptive right.
... The Zuni Tribe has not attempted to hide their pilgrimage or the
route they were taking, although they do regard it as a personal and private
activity. It was known generally throughout the community that the Zuni
Indians took a pilgrimage every few years. It was also common knowledge in
the community, generally, what route or over which lands the pilgrimage
took place. Mrs. Hinkson, a resident of the St. John's area since 1938 and an
owner of a ranch which the Zuni Indians cross on their pilgrimage, testified
it was generally understood that the Zuni Tribe had set a precedent of cross-
ing the land of ranchers that could not be changed even if owners of the
lands objected to such crossings or use of their property. The Zuni tribe also
cut, tore down or placed gates in, or fences on the property owned or leased
by defendant and others.
This Court draws the reasonable inference, from all the facts and circum-
stances, that Earl Platt, the defendant in this case, was aware that a pilgrimage
occurred, that it occurred approximately every four years and that the pil-
grimage went across his property.
Platt, 730 F Supp. at 322-23.
270. Id. at 324.
271. Meshorer, supra note 263, at 217; see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-
tective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,452 (1988).
272. Rights of way on the unreserved public lands controlled by the BLM must,
since 1976, be acquired under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1761-1771. See generally Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 E2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
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way across the public domain under a nineteenth century statute called
R.S. 2477.273
C. R.S. 2477
Immediately following the Civil War and after a debate on the pos-
sible nationalizing of the California goldmines in order to pay the war
debt,274 Congress deferred to the strident western interests and passed the
Mining Act of 1866.271 The Act was designed to validate uses initiated by
trespass on the western public domain, and to facilitate future mining,
homesteading, and water use.276 Section Eight of the Act provided "that
the right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not
reserved for public uses, is hereby granted."2 7 This simple sentence re-
ferred to as Revised Statute 2477, or R.S. 2477, was later codified 7 and
remained operative until 1976, when it was repealed by the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).279 FLPMA, though substi-
tuting a complex procedure for future rights-of-way on public lands,
20
preserved rights-of-way that had vested under R.S. 2477 prior to 1976.281
Management and regulation of the federal lands is thus limited-but not
precluded-by the existence of these grand-fathered rights.2 2 Given the
potentially disruptive impact of R.S. 2477, rights-of-way on federal land
management, especially for land set aside for preservation purposes, have
become controversial weapons or political tools in the power struggles
between the federal government and state and local interests..2 The state,
273. See discussion infra Part llI.C.
274. JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAw 9-16 (1987).
275. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over the Pub-
lic Lands and for Other Purposes, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866) [hereinafter The Mining Act
of 1866].
276. See Robert H. Hughes, That Was Then, But Thats "hat Counts: Freezing the Law
of R.S. 2477,2002 UTAH L. REV. 679 (2002).
277. The Mining Act of 1866, § 8 at 253.
278. 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976).
279. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1785 (2000).
280. 43 U.S.C. § 1761-1771 (2000).
281. 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a) (2000); see W Aggregates v. County ofYuba, 101 Cal. App.
4th 278, 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
282. See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F2d 1068, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 1988), rev'd. on other
grounds by Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Merch, 956 F2d 970 (10th Cir.
1992).
283. See Hughes, supra note 276, at 679-81. He notes:
During the last decade, perhaps no public lands issue has been more
controversial than the debate over wilderness designations on Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) lands. By the terms of the Federal Lands Policy
and Management Act (FLPMA), wilderness areas can only be created on
BLM lands if those lands are "roadless." As a result, much of the fight over
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local, and private leverage stems from the fact that a R.S. 2477 right-of-
way, if improved, can preclude a wilderness designation for a federal
tract.284 Moreover, a right-of-way, as vested property, cannot be taken or
destroyed without the payment ofjust compensation.285
R.S. 2477's usefulness as a tool for the protection of aboriginal ac-
cess routes to sacred sites or of Indian trails sacred in their own essence286
will depend in part on how state law defines the statute's "construction of
highways" requirement. Some states view the construction necessary for
vesting the right as continuous usage, including foot or horse travel.287
Other states would require mechanical construction.2 88 If the latter view is
operative, then one would be hard pressed to find evidence of aboriginal
roadways-with the exception, perhaps, of the famed Anasazi roadways
wilderness designations has focused on roads. Wilderness advocates argue for
a strict definition of roads-one that would not include old wagon trails, and
would thereby open up more land for potential wilderness designation.
Wilderness opponents, on the other hand--often states and rural counties-
argue for a definition of roads that includes wagon trails and jeep tracks, and
would therefore preclude wilderness designations on a great deal of the
western landscape.
Id. at 679 (citations omitted).
284. See id. at 679-82.
285. See, e.g., Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,291 (1983).
286. See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. United States Forest Service, 177 E3d 800,
806-09 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the Huckleberry Divide Trail).
287. See Wilkenson v. Dep't of Interior, 634 E Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1986).
The parties are in agreement that the right of way statute is applied by refer-
ence to state law to determine when the offer of grant has been accepted by
the "construction of highways."
In Colorado, the term "highways" includes footpaths. "Highways" under
43 U.S.C. § 932 can also be roads "formed by the passage of wagons, etc.,
over the natural soil." The trails and wagon roads over the lands which be-
came part of the Colorado National Monument were sufficient to be
"highways" under 43 U.S.C. § 932.
Id. at 1271 (citations omitted).
288. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 147 F Supp. 2d 1130 (D.
Utah 2001), appeal dismissed, 69 Fed. Appx. 927 (10th Cir. 2003).The court stated:
Some form of mechanical construction must have occurred to construct or
improve the highway. A highway right-of-way cannot be established by hap-
hazard, unintentional, or incomplete actions. For example, the mere passage
of vehicles across the land, in the absence of any other evidence, is not suffi-
cient to meet the construction criteria of R.S. 2477 and to establish that a
highway right-of-way was granted.
Id. at 1138.
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leading out of Chaco Canyon, New Mexico and extending hundreds of
miles in all directions:
The Chacoan roads are almost obsessively straight linear seg-
ments that tend to go directly across terrain changes rather
than around them. The Chacoans made cuts through hills, oc-
casionally built causeways or bridges across low spots or small
washes, and constructed ramps and platforms to aid in passage
out of the canyon. The roads were of extraordinary width,
considering the lack of vehicles and animals. Main segments
within the canyon were a consistent nine meters in width,
while spur routes were half that. Roads outside the canyon
ranged from eight to twelve meters wide, with the width con-
stant along a particular linear segment. The undeviating
straightness of the direction and the uniformity of the width
indicate the probability that the Chacoans used some effective
form of surveying to chart the dimensions. Any redirection of
the roads tended to be abrupt and angled rather than gradual
and rounded, and tended to occur on high points in the ter-
rain, thus bolstering the supposition of route surveyal.
The sides of the roadways were marked by rock berms [sic]
and occasionally by walls, and the stones used in building the
bordering were apparently cleared from the road's surface. In-
deed, a road's bed was often excavated to a depth of thirty
centimeters or more, down to rock or hard soil. The depth of
the excavation misled some archaeologists into an initial specu-
lation that the segments were canals. 289
The problem of applying R.S. 2477 to the Chacoan roads is less an
engineering issue and more a question of abandonment. Vested property
rights can be abandoned, although the presumption is against it.29 Even if
the burden of proof is on the party contending a highway was abandoned,
such party would undoubtedly be aided by the fact that the Anasazi left
the area almost 900 years ago.29' There is, however, the possibility that
modern usage of the roadway, before 1976, by area Indian tribes, Rio
Grande Pueblo, or new-age believers2 2 could rekindle the right, assuming
no federal withdrawal or reliance would preclude this. The custom
289. John W Ragsdale, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the Chacoan State, 64 UMKC L. Rv.
485, 515 (1996) [hereinafter Ragsdale, The Rise and Fall].
290. W Aggregates v. County of Yuba, 101 Cal. App. 4th 278, 304-05 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
291. Ragsdale, The Rise and Fall, supra note 289, at 544.
292. See Alan Augustson, Chaco Canyon: An Illustration of Cultures in Conflict, at http://
www2.uic.edu/-aaugus2/documents/writing%20sample%20I1.doc (last visited Feb. 15,
2004).
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decision in Oregon 293 and the assertions of several states that R.S. 2977
vested rights began with Indian usage and were continued into the
present serve as precedent for this cross-culture tacking. 294
D. Regulation
The aboriginal land uses of tribes and individuals can be protected
best through the conferral or recognition of fee title or fee title in trust,
which fits seamlessly into the American legal and constitutional scheme of
property rights.29 Unrecognized aboriginal rights, though subject to con-
gressional extinguishment without the right to just compensation,2 96 are at
least protected against all but the federal government297 and are, in a prac-
tical sense, a basis for federal compensation that is politically, if not
constitutionally, mandated.29' Aboriginal use of federal land may be pro-
tected in the regulatory arena, although not with the certainty or
completeness of protection afforded by ownership of property.
Aboriginal usage of federal land that is associated with religious be-
lief or cultural centrality is more likely to receive regulatory protection
than ordinary gain-seeking. Thus, traditional subsistence hunting by Alaska
natives received special regulatory treatment,29 while the Danns' unli-
censed cattle and horse ranching did not."° The element of central
religious belief, however, poses constitutional issues beyond politics. On
293. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676-78 (1969).
294. See Colorado Environmental Coalition Alleged Highway Claims Threaten Dinosaur
National Park, at http://www.ourcolorado.org/alerts/061703_rs2477_dinosaur.htm (last
visited Feb. 4, 2004). This notes:
Moffat County claims the Yampa River Canyon for more than 20 miles as a
"constructed highway." County data gathered to support the assertion claims
that the right-of-way was "built by Indians" in the 1800s and that it was used
in winter to feed cattle when users of this alleged route "drove on ice."
Id.
295. See, e.g., Timbisha Shoshone Homeland Act, 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa (2000). The Act
provided title to the tribe for over 7000 acres within Death Valley National Park. The
lands, part of the Timbisha Shoshone's aboriginal range, are to be held in trust for the tribe
by the federal government. Id.
296. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
297. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
298. See 25 U.S.C % 70-70a(4) (1946); see also Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1601-1629(h) (1971). In return for the extinguishment of aboriginal title to
over 365 million acres, the United States promised forty-four million acres, and almost a
billion dollars to the Alaska Natives.
299. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C § 3101-3233
(2000).
300. See supra notes 195-97.
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the one hand, protective regulation may be necessary to avoid interference
with the free exercise of religion. For awhile, the constitutional law
seemed to say that facially neutral legislation, falling on religious usage or
practice with substantial impact, necessitated strict judicial scrutiny, or the
demonstration of a compelling governmental interest and lack of less re-
strictive alternatives.
0 1
On the other hand, there are potential problems with the regulatory
protections of aboriginal religious uses on federal land, some practical and
some, perhaps, constitutional. On the practicality side, there is the issue of
quantity. Aboriginal use of and relation to the land is, almost inevitably,
imbued with a sense of the sacred.30 2 To traditional Indians, the relation-
ship with the land is a spiritual reciprocating bond and is never self-
serving or purely secular.30 3 If the entire landscape becomes charged with
belief and sacredness, then the possibilities of inertia or a blockage of
transformative federal action arise. In a constitutional sense, the regulatory
protection of tribalists' usage of federal land, though avoiding the Scylla of
free exercise impact, may fall into the Charybdis trap of the Establishment
Clause3 4 or, possibly, the prohibition against race-based preferences. 30 1
The mundane and the theoretical came to the fore in Lyng v. North-
west Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n3 °6 and the result was a reconfiguration
of the constitutional law. After Lyng, an incidental or indirect impact on
Indian religious usage of federal land did not require strict scrutiny analy-
sis unless the impact was intentional, coercive, or discriminatory.3 7 The
Court's concern was with the practical problem of a potential Indian veto
over federal management of "what is, after all, its land." '3 From the side of
constitutional theory, the court said, somewhat disingenuously, that inci-
dental effects, even if devastating, cannot be deemed the presumptive
prohibition of the free exercise of religion.3 9 The court soothingly sug-
gested, however, that there might be room within the Establishment
Clause for a certain amount of administrative accommodation. 310
301. Sherbert v.Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-09 (1963).
302. See PEGGY V. BECK ET AL., THE SACRED: WAYS OF KNOWLEDGE, SOURCES OF LIFE
3-22 (1992).
303. See COLLIER, supra note 4, at 15-28.
304. See Badoni v. Higgenson, 638 E2d 172, 178-79 (10th Cir. 1980).
305. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-36 (1995). The issues of
equal protection and race-based legislation have been avoided, somewhat uneasily, by Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-55 (1974), which holds that legislation involving Indian tribes
is political in nature rather than racial, and thus strict scrutiny is not warranted.
306. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
307. Id. at 450-53.
308. Id. at 453.
309. Id. at 450-51.
310. Id. at 454.
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Lyng involved what was, to many, an arcane or quaint concern: the
aboriginal religious use of federal land by traditional Indians. The force of
Lyng, however, was taken beyond the Indians' use of the land into the
regulatory mainstream by Employment Divison v. Smith.311 Smith held that
land management statutes, as well as general regulation, were immune
from strict scrutiny regarding the incidental impact on religion."2
Congress, like a mule hit between the ears by a log, was galvanized. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993313 (RFRA) sought to
overturn the effect of Smith and restore the compelling interest test of
Sherbert v. Verner"' as a statutory rather than constitutional matter.
But Congress had stepped into the breach too hard and too far for
the Supreme Court, which struck down RFRA's application to the states
as an unauthorized exercise of power in City of Boerne v. Flores.15 The
Court held that RFRA was an attempt to enlarge a constitutional right
rather than protect it, and was thus in excess of Congress' enforcement
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment."6
Despite the holding in Boerne, RFRA remained applicable to the
federal government. 31 7 Theoretically, and literally, the compelling interest test
could apply to federal land regulations that impacted aboriginal Indian
religious practices on federal land. The legislative history to RFRA,
however, has defused this potential as a matter of congressional intent if
not actual statutory language.
318
311. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
312. Id. at 883.
313. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000).
314. See Sherbert v.Verner, 374 U.S. 398,404-09 (1963).
315. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
316. Id. at 516-36.
317. See, e.g., United States v. Antoine, 318 E3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v.
Babbitt, 223 E3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000).
318. See S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 3 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.This
indicates:
Pre-Smith case law makes it clear that only governmental actions that place a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion must meet the compelling in-
terest test set forth in the act. The act thus would not require such a
justification for every government action that may have some incidental ef-
fect on religious institutions. And, while the committee expresses neither
approval nor disapproval of that case law, pre-Smith case law makes it clear
that strict scrutiny does not apply to government actions involving only
management of internal Government affairs or the use of the Government's
own property or resources.
Id. at 1898 (citing Lyng). But seeThiry v. Carlson, 78 F3d 1491 (10th Cit. 1996) (applying
RFRA to a government property case). The Thiry court stated: "The Court's analysis in
Lyng did not rest on property ownership. Rather it focused on the nature and extent of
the intrusion on religious beliefs and practices as such." Id. at 1495 n.2.
[VOL. 9:323
Individual Aboriginal Rights
Congress recently overhauled the engine of RFRA and retrofitted it
for state service. Congress attempted to sidestep the concern with author-
ity in Boerne by re-passing the compelling state interest test under a
variety of authority sources.The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000319 (RLUIPA) invokes the taxing and spending powers,
the interstate commerce power, and the individualized assessments aspects
of Sherbert v. Verner that remained in the aftermath of Lyng.32° Though the
RLUIPA has survived early challenges to authority 21 at least one case
raised the possibility of Establishment Clause problems under this statute,
at least in the context of institutionalized persons.322
319. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000).
320. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A)-(C).
321. See, e.g., Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware County v. Township of Middle-
town, 204 F Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that the RLUIPA's land use provisions
are constitutionally authorized, both facially and as applied); see also United States v. Maui
County, 298 E Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Haw. 2003) (holding that the RLUIPA was not facially
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, did not violate the Tenth Amendment, and
was a valid exercise of Congress's enforcement power under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment). But see Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F
Supp. 2d 1083, 1102, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that Congress exceeded its powers
under Section Five and under the Commerce Clause).
322. Madison v. Riter, 240 F Supp. 2d 566 (W.D.Va. 2003). According to the district
court:
It is often difficult to determine the lines of demarcation between free
exercise and establishment, and accommodation and promotion, but
RLUIPA does not appear to be a close case. The Act, as it relates to the con-
stitutional claims of religious inmates, raises the level of protection of
religious rights only, leaving other, equally fundamental rights languishing
under the pressure of judicial deference to the decisions of prison officials.
When applied to prison inmates, to whom privileges and exceptions to
prison regulations are few, the different standards of review have the effect of
establishing two tiers of inmates in the prison system: the favored believer
and the disadvantaged non-believer. It is this precise result that the Lemon
test and the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence seek to
prevent, and it is therefore the obligation of this Court to declare the section
of RLUIPA that pertains to prison inmates UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Id. at 582 (citations omitted). In accord is Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003).
The district court was overruled in Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003), which
held that RLUIPA, in contrast to the holdings in the district court and in the Cutter
opinion did not violate the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).The
Lemon test states that, to avoid the Establishment Clause, legislation must have a secular
purpose, it must not have the impermissible effect of advancing religion, and it must not
create excessive government entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The
Fourth Circuit Court ofAppeals held that:
Section 3 of RLUIPA thus satisfies the three-prongs of the Lemon test. The
opposite conclusion, we believe would work a profound change in the Su-
preme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and in the ability of
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Given the limiting language in RFRA's legislative history and the
Establishment Clause issues recently emergent in RLUIPA, 23 a less
problematic hope for the statutory protection of aboriginal religious uses
on federal lands may be in the context of procedural statutes such as the
National Historic Preservation Act 2. (NHPA). Section 106 of the NHPA
requires federal agencies such as the Forest Service and the BLM to take
into account the effect of any federal undertaking on structures or sites that
are included or may be eligible for inclusion on the National Register."'
Though Section 106 may not afford a complete substantive protection for
aboriginal usage of federal land, it does afford Indians the right to consult
and the right to demand that agencies attempt to identify traditional
cultural properties that may be affected and find ways to avoid or reduce
the impact.32 6
E. Administrative Accommodation
In Lyng, the Supreme Court expressed that solicitude for land-based
aboriginal religious practices was in accord with the policies of the
United States. 32" The Court did not, however, define the limits of that pol-
icy or accommodative efforts. President Clinton confirmed the policy, if
not the boundaries, of accommodation with a 1996 executive order.328
The executive order made accommodation the responsibility of the fed-
eral executive to the extent practical, legally permissible, and consistent
with essential agency function.3 19 Federal land managers responded in a
number of situations involving sacred sites or aboriginal religious usage in
national parks or monuments. Administrative management plans sought,
Congress to facilitate the free exercise of religion in this country. It would
throw into question a wide variety of religious accommodation laws.
Madison, 355 E3d at 320.
323. See, e.g., Cutter v.Wilkinson, 349 E3d 257, 269 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000cc-i violates the
Establishment Clause). Though the mandate of the case was recalled on December 16,
2003, a rehearing was denied en banc on March 3,2004.
324. 16 U.S.C. 55 470-470x-6 (2000).
325. 16 U.S.C. 5 470f.
326. See Walter E. Stern & Lynn H. Slade, Effects of Historic and Cultural Resources and
Indian Religious Freedom on Public Lands Development:A Practical Primer, 35 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 133, 144-54 (1995); see also Attakai v. United States, 746 F Supp. 1395, 1405-09 (D.
Ariz. 1990); Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 E3d 856, 859-63 (10th Cir. 1995).
327. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetry Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 454-55
(1988) (citing the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. §5 1996-1996b
(2000)).
328. Exec. Order No. 13,007,61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
329. Id.
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generally on a voluntary basis, to dissuade the public from actions that
would substantially interfere with traditional religious practices.33 The
administrative efforts were in general carefully limited as to time, place,
and impact on non-Indians. For example, the Climbing Management
Plan at Devil's Tower National Monument sought to discourage (but not
prohibit) rock climbing on the Tower, a sacred site to area tribes, during
the month of June, which is a time of high cultural significance.331 In an-
other case, visitors to Rainbow Bridge National Monument, a holy site to
the Navajo, but a compelling natural bridge to others, were requested (but
not ordered) to refrain from walking on or under the arch.3 2
Litigation by the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a conservative
strike force, challenged these and other administrative efforts as violative
of the Establishment Clause. The claims have been ineffective to date,
largely because of the voluntary nature of the restraints. Climbers, affected
only by a request to refrain from climbing in June, were deemed not to
have suffered an injury in fact and not to have standing to raise First
Amendment establishment claims.333
The policy of requesting voluntary forbearance from walking under
Rainbow Bridge was, in contrast to Bear Lodge,3 3 4 sufficient to confer
standing in Natural Arch and Bridge Society v. Alston.33- Such a policy was
not, however, found violative of the Establishment Clause. The court
found that the policy promoted a secular cultural purpose and did not
have the principal effect of advancing religious doctrine or communicat-
ing a governmental endorsement of religion.3 6 Furthermore, the court
found that the policy does not lead to the excessive entanglement of
church and state.
3 7
It seems clear from the case law that a mandatory closure is more
questionable from the constitutional standpoint than a request to refrain.
It is still not entirely clear, however, whether a temporary closure would
offend the Establishment Clause or whether a violation would necessitate
either the showing of an illicit federal motive or the demonstration that at
330. See Chris Smith & Elizabeth Manning, The Sacred and Profane Collide in the West,
HIGH COUNTRY NEws, May 26, 1997, at *5, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/
hcn.URLRemapper/1997/may26/dir/FeatureThesacred.html.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n. v. Babbitt, 175 F3d 814,822 (10th Cir. 1999).
334. Id.
335. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F Supp. 2d 1207, 1218-19 (D. Utah
2002), aft'd, 2004 WL 569888 (10th Cir. 2004).
336. Id. at 1223-25.
337. Id. at 1225-26 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,615 (1971)).
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least some members of the excluded public were offended by the symbol-
ism protected. 338
CONCLUSIONS-WITH A WARY EYE TOWARD
EMERGING CONCEPTS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The concept of individual aboriginal rights is a property-based at-
tempt to ameliorate part of the shattering impact of dispossession, growth
economics, and politics on the indigenous natives' relation with the land.
Individual aboriginal rights and the related concepts of custom, prescrip-
tion, and preemptory action under statute may permit and protect the
core residuum of central uses and cultural practices that have emerged out
of the past, continued into the present, and in reality, pose relatively little
economic difficulty for the federal government or nation.
There is a storm cloud emerging on the legal horizon that may
compromise even these partial accommodations. The threat is generated
by conservative judicial wolves wrapped in liberal lamb's fleece-
ostensibly professing homage to fundamental human dignity, but in actual
service to free market economics and bloodless efficiency. That threat,
which was first thrust upon the Indian tribes in their previous dark hours
of assimilation and termination, is the relentless concept of colorblind
equal protection. It is the idea that no legal distinctions drawn among
people on the basis of race or national origin should escape strict judicial
scrutiny-even if the targeted groups have endured centuries of injustice
and unfulfilled promises of recompense. 3 9
338. See Wyoming Sawmills v. United States Forest Service, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1293-94 (D.Wyo. 2001).
[Slawm ills alleges that a plaintiff has standing to bring an establishment clause
claim if a regulation prevents a plaintiff from freely using public areas. This
proposition is correct, in part. The Tenth Circuit requires the regulation to
prevent a plaintiff from freely using public areas because the plaintiff is offended
by the religious symbolism that the regulation advances.
Id. at 1293-94.
339. The case of Adarand Constructors v Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) confirms the con-
stitutional command that all race-based classifications must be analyzed under the strict
scrutiny test of compelling governmental interest and a lack of less restrictive alternatives.
Id. at 235-36.Justice Rehnquist, an adherent of the Adarand position, has shown a particu-
lar willingness to oppose special remedial treatment for the tribes in favor of a formal
modern equality that paves over injustices in the past. In Oneida County v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985), he joined in dissent against a majority holding that confirmed
a common law right in tribes to seek the return of lands taken by the states without fed-
eral authorization. Id. at 255-73. The dissenters stated that "the Framers recognized that
no one ought to be condemned for his forefathers misdeeds-even when the crime is a
most grave offense against the Republic." Id. at 273. In United States v. Sioux Nation of
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The war-dogs of equality have, in the Indian law arena, been kept
shakily at bay by Morton v. Mancari,3 4° which sustained the use of an Indian
preference for employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and simulta-
neously shielded Indian legislation in general from the harsh glare of strict
scrutiny.3 4' A growing body of case law is nipping at the flanks of Morton342
and although the core of the case remains intact3 43 it is worthwhile to ex-
amine the strength of its underpinnings.
Morton holds, somewhat parenthetically, that classifications dealing
with Indian tribes are political in nature and thus not subject to strict
scrutiny.3" Political aspects are undeniable at least in the cases involving
federally recognized tribes,34 but some recent decisions state that an over-
lap between a political class or an ancestral group and a racial
characteristic may not be sufficient to avoid strict scrutiny. In Cayetaro v.
Rice,346 the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to and ultimately invali-
dated a class of native Hawaiians, composed of present day descendants of
ancestors living in Hawaii at the first European visitation. The court said
that ancestry, even if allied with precedent politics, can be a proxy for
race.34 7 Thus, the political rationale, though relevant, may not be complete
in the context of the Fifteenth Amendment48 in the case of unrecognized
Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980),Justice Rehnquist dissented from an award for compensation
for the 1877 seizure of the treaty-protected Black Hills. He stated:
that there was tragedy, deception, barbarity, and virtually every other vice
known to man in the 300 year history of the expansion of the original 13
Colonies into a Nation which now embraces more than three million square
miles and 50 States cannot be denied. But in a court opinion, as a historical
and not a legal matter, both settler and Indian are entitled to the benefit of
the Biblical adjuration: 'Judge not, ye be not judged.'
Id. at 437.
340. See supra note 305.
341. Morton v. Mancari, 471 U.S. 535,552-55 (1974).
342. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519-20 (2000); Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 E3d
1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2002); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997);
Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 42 F Supp. 2d 927, 937-38 (D. Alaska 1999), aff'd, 335
F3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003); Tafoya v. City of Albuquerque, 751 F Supp. 1527, 1531 (D. N.M.
1990).
343. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 330 F3d 513,
521-22 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 957 (2003); Artichoke Joe's v. Norton, 216
F Supp. 2d 1084, 1128-32 (E.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 353 F3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003).
344. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
345. Id.
346. See Cayetano, 528 U.S. at 519-20; Arakaki, 314 E3d at 1094-95; Malabed, 42 F
Supp. 2d at 937-38, aff'd, 335 F3d 864; Babbitt, 115 F3d at 665; City ofAlbuquerque, 751 E
Supp. at 1531.
347. Cayetano, 528 U.S. at 514.
348. Id. at 520; Arakaki, 314 F3d at 1095.
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tribes3 49 and with respect to Indian individuals living outside the tribal
context."'
There is also a constitutional rationale for Morton and its progeny.
The Commerce Clause delegates power to Congress to regulate com-
merce with the Indian tribes."' Classes based on or relating to Indian
tribes are thus authorized directly under the Constitution. They can thus
be deemed inherently non-arbitrary in nature and not subject to the pre-
sumptive invalidity implicit in the strict scrutiny approach. 352 It could be
argued, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment, as incorporated by the
Fifth, 3 3 has qualified this power or limited it more precisely to the con-
tours of politics or commerce.
A third rationale is reflected in the Morton admonition that to escape
strict scrutiny, a law must be a rational fulfillment of Congress' unique
obligation.3 4 This is a narrower statement of the traditional rational basis
test for equal protection which requires only debatably reasonable means
to any legitimate governmental objective. 35 Morton would sustain the use
of such judicial deference only so long as Congress is in pursuit of its
unique trust obligation to the Indian tribes. Thus, trust responsibility is a
349. Cayetano, 528 U.S. at 519-20.
350. Malabed, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 928,941-42.
351. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
352. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States, 330 F.3d 513,
520-22 (2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 957 (2003).The Court stated that:
The critical consideration is Congress' power to regulate commerce "with
the Indian Tribes." While Congress may use this power to regulate tribal
members, see United States v. Holliday, regulation of commerce with tribes is
at the heart of the Clause, particularly when the tribal commerce is with the
federal government, as it is here.When Congress exercises this constitutional
power it necessarily must engage in classifications that deal with Indian
tribes.Justice Scalia, when he was on our court, put the matter this way: "in a
sense the Constitution itself establishes the rationality of the ... classification,
by providing a separate federal power that reaches only the present group."
United States v. Cohen. He then quoted the following passage from United
States v. Antelope: the "Constitution itself provides support for legislation di-
rected specifically at Indian tribes."
Id. at 521-22 (citations omitted).
353. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
354. Justice Blackmun stated:
As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments
will not be disturbed. Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally
designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Congress'
classification violates due process.
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,555 (1974).
355. See, e.g.,Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,490 (1955).
[VOL. 9:323
Individual Aboriginal Rights
basis for the holding on Indian classification in Morton-and is also a limit.
When Congress is in the arena of trust fulfillment, an arena demarked by
objective, rather than presumptive, good faith,3 6 it is given a wide range of
discretion as to means. Outside the parameters of the trust responsibility,
the rigors of the Constitution and strict scrutiny will predominate 5 7
None of these rationales and justifications work particularly well
when legislation or judicial decisions focus on Indians unrelated to a fed-
erally recognized tribe. If law takes a separate path due solely to race and
not tribal status, then the suspect class's equal protection issues are directly
joined-even more so if the law has discernibly negative impacts either
within or without the affected class.3
58
356. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). The Court
stated that:
In determining whether Congress has made a good faith effort to give the
Indians the full value of their lands when the government acquired [them],
we therefore look to the objective facts as revealed by Acts of Congress,
Congressional committee reports, statements submitted to Congress by gov-
ernment officials, reports of special commissions appointed by Congress to
treat with the Indians, and similar evidence relating to the acquisition.
The "good faith effort" and "transmutation of property" concepts referred
to in Fort Berthold are opposite sides of the same coin. They reflect the tradi-
tional rule that a trustee may change the form of trust assets as long as he
fairly (or in good faith) attempts to provide his ward with property of
equivalent value. If he does that, he cannot be faulted if hindsight should
demonstrate a lack of precise equivalence. On the other hand, if a trustee (or
the government in its dealings with the Indians) does not attempt to give the
ward the fair equivalent of what he acquires from him, the trustee to that ex-
tent has taken rather than transmuted the property of the ward. In other
words, an essential element of the inquiry under the Fort Berthold guideline is
determining the adequacy of the consideration the government gave for the
Indian lands it acquired. That inquiry cannot be avoided by the government's
simple assertion that it acted in good faith in its dealings with the Indians."
449 U.S. at 416 (quoting with approval the test used in Three Tribes of Fort Berthod Reserva-
tion v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 442 (1979)).
357. The Court held that:
In sum, we conclude that the legal analysis and factual findings of the
Court of Claims fully support its conclusion that the terms of the 1877 Act
did not effect "a mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal
property." Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. Rather, the 1877 Act effected a taking of
tribal property, property which had been set aside for the exclusive occupa-
tion of the Sioux by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868.That taking implied an
obligation on the part of the Government to make just compensation to the
Sioux Nation, and that obligation, including an award of interest, must now,
at last, be paid.
Id. at 423-24 (citation omitted).
358. See Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 42 F Supp. 2d 927, 937-38 (1999), aft'd, 335
F3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003).The Court stated that:
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It is a tricky area and likely to grow more so in the future. This
might inspire aboriginal right claimants to adhere to the purely property-
based approaches such as custom, prescription, and preemption.359 If the
racial element is unavoidable, and this may be the case with individual
aboriginal rights involving culture or religion, then it would seem pru-
dent to assert membership in a federally recognized tribe even though the
decisions on individual aboriginal rights seem to stand apart from the
logic and limits of Morton.36
The protection of aboriginal usage is, in the end, more than a matter
of property, regulation, administration, or constitutional limitation. It is a
matter of value and commitment. If society, after education and reflection,
finds worth in the ancient antecedents, it can and will preserve them.36'
North Slope Transit contends NSB's employment preference is merely a
preference favoring a political classification (tribal membership) and thus
subject to a low level of scrutiny. The distinction related to a tribe's political
nature finds its source in the sovereign nature of Native American tribes.
Morton v. Mancari, is based on the relationship between sovereign govern-
ments; that is, Indian tribes and the federal government. Mancari upheld an
employment preference used by the Bureau of Indian Affairs because the
court concluded the preference served the federal government's goal of pro-
moting Indian self-government. The Ninth Circuit interprets Mancari "as
shielding only those statutes that affect uniquely Indian interests." This inter-
pretation is consistent with long-recognized principles. NSB's employment
preference is in no way related to Native land or tribal or cultural affairs.
Public employment with NSB is not part of some uniquely Indian interest,
or time-honored, tribal tradition. Mancaris rationale would seem inapplicable
here. However, this court need not decide whether NSB's preference is based
on a political or racial classification. Characterization of the preferences as a
political rather than a racial classification does not automatically result in a
lower level of scrutiny being employed.
Id. at 937-38.
359. See Meshorer, supra note 263, at 209-10.
360. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923). In Cramer, the Court
stated that:
Unquestionably it has been the policy of the federal government from the
beginning to respect the Indian right of occupancy, which could only be in-
terfered with or determined by the United States. It is true that this policy
has had in view the original nomadic tribal occupancy, but it is likewise true
that in its essential spirit it applies to individual Indian occupancy as well;
and the reasons for maintaining it in the latter case would seem to be no less
cogent, since such occupancy being of a fixed character lends support to an-
other well understood policy, namely, that of inducing the Indian to forsake
his wandering habits and adopt those of civilized life.
Id. at 227 (citations omitted).
361. See Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing
Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 375 (1991).Wilkinson stated that:
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America, despite its tortured, troubled Indian past, remains, in the present
and future, a steward and beneficiary of the living remnants of the tribal
cultures.362 As a final rationale for the protection of aboriginal usages such
as those of the Western Shoshone, the Danns, and the Zunis, we can con-
sider the fundamental Indian principle of reciprocity.6 As a society, we
gain from the preservation of these living modern facets of the continent's
past. They give us perspective and coherence. To respect and maintain
them enhances our own integrity and sense of place.
But there is a last, and truest, reason why Chippewa rights should be in-
stitutionalized in a tribal-state compact and why they should endure forever
in Wisconsin. That reason-which goes beyond the wise use of public funds,
good conservation practices, the community good will that flows from co-
operation and even the fact that the air will no longer be tinged with
racism-is that these rights are organic and grew out of a context that has
dignity and deserves to be honored. This transcends the pervasive principle
of our legal system that promises ought to be kept. Even more than that, on
their merits these were fair promises, fair when made, even fairer today given
that most of their companion promises have been torn away.
Indian people have an ability to stretch their minds, to search far back and
far ahead. The Chippewa were thinking in those terms at treaty time-
thinking of the long procession back ten thousand years or more, thinking of
an equally long procession out ahead. Those treaties were signed amid the
din of a collision of cultures, but the Chippewa held firm to their world
view, as best as they could.
That world view was lodged in federal treaties-it became law. It matters
that the world view is now law. But it matters, too, that this law is a wise law,
a just law, with roots deep in history, minority rights, land title, sovereign pre-
rogatives and a historical trust obligation. The Chippewa negotiators did the
right thing, they looked across the prairie and felt the summer in the spring,
and we should honor that view by reaffirming our promise that it may con-
tinue, with the full and welcoming support of the state and federal
governments, forever.
Id. at 413-14.
362. See John W Ragsdale, Jr., Indian Reservations and the Preservation of Tribal Culture:
Beyond Wardship to Stewardship, 59 UMKC L. Pv. 503 (1991).
363. BARRY LOPEZ,THE REDISCOvERY OF NORTH AMERICA 23-27 (1990).
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